Articles

One of Iran’s best known lakes is disappearing. These photos show what’s left behind as the waters recede.

by Yochi Dreazen on September 29, 2016

Lake Urmia, in the mountains of northwestern Iran, was once a source of national pride and one of the country’s top tourism destinations. It’s emerging now as something else entirely: Iran’s most visible symbol of the damage being wrought by global climate change. Read More »

Los Angeles Times

Hamid Reza Karimi, 24, left, and Ismail Karimi, 36, are unable to plant this plot of land because of the water shortage in Iran.

by:Shashank Bengali, Ramin Mostaghim

Watermelons once sprung from this soil, the giant striped fruit dotting the arid landscape like mushrooms after a rain. Read More »

By: Adrienne Mahsa Varkiani

“When I became Secretary of State, Iran was weeks away from having enough nuclear material to form a bomb.” Read More »

by Peter Jenkins

Many Europeans are indifferent to whether the occupant of the White House is a Democrat or a Republican. What concerns them is that he or she be a “safe pair of hands.” They want someone who is knowledgeable and intelligent on the one hand, and dispassionate and free of prejudice on the other hand. Read More »

While complying with the terms of the nuclear weapons agreement, Iran will continue to test and improve the range and accuracy of its ballistic missiles to deter or coerce potential adversaries — the United States operating in the region, Gulf Arab states, Turkey and Israel – four Middle East experts said last week. Read More »

By: Shirin Hakim and Kaveh Madani

Lake Urmia’s grim destiny reflects a wider trend of enviromental problems in Iran, including an over-reliance on dams, extreme weather patterns, climatic changes, poor irrigation practices and unregulated use of water

Long tucked away behind the mountains of northwest Iran, Lake Urmia is becoming a national symbol of environmental degradation that is eliciting public sensitivity and awareness. Launched at the end of August, the ‘I am Lake Urmia’ campaign is a grassroots effort to collect a million signatures to push the United Nations to discuss ways to revive this salt lake, which has lost 90% of its surface area since the 1970s. Read More »

By Tim Hepher | PARIS 21, September 2016

The United States has begun unblocking deals by Western plane-makers to renew Iran’s ageing passenger fleet in a move likely to ease growing complaints from Tehran over the implementation of last year’s historic sanctions deal.

Europe’s Airbus (AIR.PA) said on Wednesday it had received U.S. Treasury approval to begin exporting jetliners to Iran and its U.S. rival Boeing (BA.N) said it looked forward to receiving similar licenses “shortly”.

The move signals the unfreezing of one of the most high-profile deals between Iran and foreign companies since last year’s agreement between Tehran and world powers to open up trade in exchange for curbs on the country’s nuclear activities.

But complex questions remain over the financing of deals between Iran and Western plane-makers that could still obstruct deliveries of many of the planes, in what is seen as a test case for Western trade and investment following the nuclear deal.

Earlier this year, Airbus and its U.S. rival Boeing each signed deals to supply over 100 jets to flag carrier Iran Air to modernize and expand the country’s elderly fleet, held together by smuggled or improvised parts after years of sanctions.

But nine months after the first deal was signed, Iranian officials have voiced growing concerns about what they see as slow progress in obtaining in the U.S. licenses needed for most modern aircraft because of their ample use of U.S. parts.

An Iranian official told Reuters earlier this week that its deal for 118 Airbus jets was being trimmed by six units following the regulatory delays.

Airbus said on Wednesday it had been granted an initial license to supply 17 A320 or A330 jets that are slated for early delivery, and that it expected a second license covering the remaining aircraft within the next few weeks.

Aviation sources said the U.S. Treasury was expected within “days” to begin unblocking Boeing’s deal to sell or lease over 100 jets.

Iran has also ordered up to 40 Franco-Italian ATR (AIR.PA)SIFI.MI turboprop planes that are awaiting Washington’s green light.

Iran has said it could start receiving a limited number of aircraft this year.

Some airlines are also looking at buying second-hand planes to meet their most urgent needs.

Diplomats say new jets will allow pragmatist President Hassan Rouhani to argue the sanctions deal is working, but the deals are opposed by U.S. Republicans who say the jets could be misused and by conservatives in Iran who oppose the country’s opening and say the purchases will not benefit most Iranians.

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-aviation-idUSKCN11R1JH

by Paul R. Pillar 20 September 2016

The unrelenting urge among American politicians to keep punishing Iran—or more precisely, to be seen supporting steps with that objective—continues to work against sensible statecraft and U.S. interests in multiple respects. One of those respects concerns how measures taken by the United States affect political competition within Iran.

Here’s the current background to questions of U.S. policy toward Iran. The most important development in recent years regarding such policy—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the formal name for the agreement that limits Iran’s nuclear activity—has been in effect for over a year. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which does the detailed monitoring of the Iranian program, Iran is fully in compliance with its obligations under the agreement. Those in the United States who have opposed any agreement with Iran all along continue to seek any possible basis for accusing Iran of violations. One of the most recent such accusations concerned some issues of implementation that opponents described as “secret exceptions” granted to Iran. They were in fact not that but rather were typical of the detailed questions that inevitably arise in implementation of any agreement this extensive. A Joint Commission was created under the agreement precisely to resolve such questions, and it has successfully been doing exactly that. The principal real questions of adherence to the agreement involve whether the United States and the West have been fully living up to their obligations regarding sanctions relief and refraining from further steps to damage the Iranian economy.

Despite the record of Iranian compliance, the months since conclusion of the JCPOA have seen a stream of anti-Iran bills introduced in Congress. Examination of most of these bills yields little idea of how if they were to come into effect they would advance any U.S. interests pertinent to Iran, and little evidence of any thought that in this respect went into the writing of the bills. The bills instead seem to be vehicles for members to demonstrate, through their sponsorship or support of such legislation, their anti-Iran credentials.

Typical of these proposals is a recent amendment introduced by Representative Ron DeSantis (R-FL) that would require any issuer of securities, as it registers with the Securities and Exchange Commission, to declare in its registration statement whether it does business in Iran or with any entity organized under the laws of Iran. Although this may sound like an innocent requirement for information, existing law already requires such a disclosure by issuers of securities with regard to any business done with the government of Iran, the Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Iranian central bank, the entire Iranian petroleum industry, and certain other Iranian individuals and entities subject to sanctions. So the DeSantis amendment would only serve to impose the reporting requirement on those dealing with portions of the Iranian private sector that not only have no connection with the Iranian regime but also have given no reason to be sanctioned in the long history of U.S. sanctions legislation directed against Iran. This would discourage commerce with the very sectors in Iran that are most in favor of peaceful engagement with the rest of the world. The legislation would be counterproductive with regard to any political and economic evolution in Iran in a direction favorable to U.S. interests. (The legislation also probably would violate the U.S. obligation under the JCPOA not to take any new steps to prevent Iran from realizing the economic benefits of sanctions relief.)

Another recent example of a backward approach to affecting political competition within Iran is aninterview with Dennis Ross of the Washington Institute for New East Policy. Ross, operating squarely within the school of thought that sees nothing good coming out of any business with Tehran and who sees Iran only as an object for confrontation and punishment, focuses on Iran’s conduct within the Middle East. As usual with that topic and that school of thought, there are many general references to Iranian “aggression” without considering exactly what Iran is or is not doing in the region and why, say, Iranian assistance to an incumbent regime in Syria is any more “aggressive” than what other powers have been doing to stoke a rebellion and to try to overthrow the regime. And Ross’s attempt to square his position that Iran “cannot be a partner in the struggle against ISIS” with the fact that in Iraq, Iran is, just like the United States, not only supporting the incumbent regime but also actively opposing ISIS, seems to come down to an assertion that the Iranians are following narrow (undescribed) policies in Iraq that will leave a lot of angry Sunnis on their Western doorstep but evidently are too stupid to realize that is what they are doing.

For the present purpose note what Ross says about the connection between U.S. actions and political contests within the Iranian regime. He says we should try to decrease the influence of General Soleimani and the Revolutionary Guard, who favor a more “confrontational approach,” relative to the influence of president Rouhani, who favors more of a “normalizing approach.” So far so good. But how is the United States supposed to affect that Iranian political balance? Ross says we should do it by being confrontational ourselves—by “applying pressure”that would “demonstrate the costs to Iran of Soleimani’s actions.” When asked what this means in practical terms, Ross mentions military contingency planning with Israel and the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Let’s see if we have this straight. We supposedly are all agreed that we would like to see less influence in Tehran for hardliners such as those centered in the Revolutionary Guard. Those hardliners are the ones who, in debate within Iran, argue that doing peaceful business with the United States (as with the JCPOA) does not bring any benefits to Iran, that the United States is determined to use its military might and other power to harm Iran, that Washington will always be acting in cahoots with Iran’s regional rivals in Israel and the Gulf Arab states, and that Iran thus has to stand firm and tough against such predatory U.S. behavior in order to protect Iranian interests. So acting in a way that confirms the hardliners’ narrative is supposed to reduce their influence in Tehran? The groundlessness of such an argument can be seen with some role reversal. Such confrontation from a foreign adversary tends to strengthen, rather than to weaken, hawkish and hardline sentiment in U.S. politics. It works pretty much the same way in Iranian politics.

The sort of illogicality voiced by Ross has some general roots in American exceptionalism and the notion that the United States should be able to push other states around but that other states don’t push the United States around. There is more to it than that, however, where Iran is involved, as suggested by comparing the Iranian case with other cases that offer some parallels. One worth looking at is Burma (a.k.a. Myanmar). President Obama announced this week that the United States is ready to lift economic sanctions on Burma, in light of political reforms there.

This decision is not an obvious call. The Burmese military, which maintained a harsh and closed dictatorship for many years, retains much political power. The former opposition leader and now de facto head of the civilian government, Aung San Suu Kyi, has made many concessions to the military and has become in important respects a partner of the generals rather than a replacement of them. The treatment of ethnic and religious minorities, most conspicuously the Muslim Rohingya community, is still bad. Human rights organizations believe the sanctions are being lifted too soon.

The U.S. administration decided, however, that enough change has taken place in Burma to warrant change in U.S. policy toward Burma. At least as important, the administration determined that further economic and political change in a favorable direction in Burma would be more likely by opening up the country to normal commerce and relations than it would by keeping it isolated.

President Obama’s Republican opponents in Congress have, on this issue, taken a constructive and balanced approach. Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell, who has had a strong interest in Burma, made remarks on the Senate floor that appropriately noted both the progress to date and the significant problems and challenges that remain.

That’s a much different approach than McConnell and his colleagues take on Iran, and it is a difference in the approach itself and not just in the two countries involved. If they applied to Burma the same perspective they apply to Iran, what we would be hearing is that moderates in Burma don’t matter, that it is nefarious hardliners who still run the show, that gross human rights violations continue, that any relief from sanctions would mean the military-dominated regime would have more resources to do bad things, and that Obama is making a big mistake by lifting sanctions.

Two explanations chiefly account for the difference. One is the objective of denying Mr. Obama any significant foreign policy achievement, consistent with Senator McConnell’s earlier declaration that the number one objective of his caucus was to deny the president a second term. The opening to Iran and the JCPOA constitute such a significant achievement; nothing the administration is doing on Burma is of comparable importance.

The other explanation is that continued isolation and punishment of Iran is part of a larger objective of the administration’s opponents of taking sides in the Middle East, and in particular to take whatever side the Israeli government is on. Ross’s mention of military contingency planning with Israel directed against Iran represents not so much a way to scare Iran about costs of General Soleimani’s activities but instead the side-taking that underlies the impulse to keep Iran perpetually isolated and punished in the first place.

And the counterproductive effect of confirming the Iranian hardliners’ narrative is not really counterproductive if the objective is to maintain Iran as a bête noire forever; if you want a bête noire, a regime in which hardliners dominate is the best kind of bête noire to have.

Photo: Ron DeSantis (R-FL) by Gage Skidmore via Flickr.

This article was first published by the National Interest and was reprinted here with permission. Copyright The National Interest.

http://lobelog.com/our-hardliners-are-still-helping-irans-hardliners/

TEHRAN, IRAN — Small Iranian fast-attack boats race toward American warships in the Persian Gulf, turning away at the last minute as warning shots are fired – just one of many recent incidents that are prompting hard-line Iranian media to crow that the US superpower has been “humiliated, again.”

In the latest episode last weekend, Iran warned two US Navy surveillance planes flying high at the edge of its territory that it would shoot them down if they entered Iranian airspace.

Iran and the US have been provoking each other militarily for more than 30 years, engaging in a volatile tug-of-war in the Persian Gulf, where one-third of the world’s seaborne oil supply travels through the Strait of Hormuz.

But threatening incidents have spiked recently, with at least 32 reported so far this year, compared with 23 in all of 2015. Gen. Joseph Votel, the head of US Central Command, said earlier this month that Iran’s moves are an attempt to “exert their influence and authority in the region.”

The US military says all recent incidents have occurred in international waters, and that such “harassment” from Iran is “unsafe and unprofessional.” Senior Iranian officers, meanwhile, downplay their actions as “routine” and defensive – but declare that a “severe” reaction will follow if they detect any aggressive US intent.

Analysts say the uptick sends two messages from Iran’s more ideologically driven Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has been engaged in a struggle for influence with the centrist President Hassan Rouhani: First, that it will challenge its superpower enemy in its own backyard, even at the risk of escalation; and second, to remind Mr. Rouhani that, despite last year’s nuclear deal with the US and global powers, the IRGC plays a key military role, and often a provocative one.

Those calculations mean that, even as all sides downplay the dangers, the Persian Gulf remains a flashpoint.

“In the Persian Gulf, any mistake by one soldier – one soldier – could raise fire across the entire Persian Gulf or Sea of Oman. We worry about that,” says Abbas Qaidaari, a military expert at the Center for Strategic Studies, a think tank attached to Iran’s presidency. “We think that any unprofessional action, by Iranian fleets or the US and its allies, will be destructive.”

That means the stakes are high for correctly interpreting the other side’s moves. The Persian Gulf encounters are “just a signal, not a realistic action and it does not reflect our real policies. The US has to listen carefully,” suggests Mr. Qaidaari.

“In any country there are hardliners, in the US, too,” says Qaidaari, who argues that the IRGC won’t hurt the US in the Persian Gulf because of national security interests. “We have this community of hardliners who maybe want a war in the Persian Gulf. But look to the commander-in-chief [Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei]: He never wanted to start a new war in the Persian Gulf.”
Recent incidents

Among recent incidents, Iran test-fired rockets near US ships last December, and an Iranian drone passed over a US aircraft carrier in January. The US Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain, frequently conducts naval exercises with Gulf allies.

Adm. Alireza Tangsiri, acting commander of the IRGC Navy, said patrolling the Persian Gulf is a “round-the-clock mission that will continue in the future” – with particular attention paid to US activity.

Iranian conservatives cite “threatening” American behavior so close to Iran’s borders, and they recall that 10 US sailors were found in Iranian waters in January; Iran briefly seized them at gunpoint. Swift direct contact between top diplomats of both nations – an informal channel created during the nuclear talks – led to a quick resolution.

But often events move too quickly in the cramped waters of the Persian Gulf to prevent an escalation, without a dedicated line of communication. IRGC war games have included targeting replica American warships with Iranian fast-attack boats and missiles.

“We definitely believe they trespassed our waters … in most [recent] cases,” says Mohsen Rezaei, a former IRGC commander and secretary of the Expediency Council, in an interview.

To Mr. Rezaei, the reason for Iran’s concern is obvious: “The security of the Persian Gulf is in fact the security of Iran.”

“There were a few cases in which our speedboats were suspicious about their activities, so they had to get closer,” says Rezaei. Iranian craft approached even when US ships were in international waters.

“Our speedboats mostly just send them a warning – they don’t actually take any action – to understand the reaction of the other side,” says Rezaei. Are those actions dangerous? “Not from our side.”

Hard-line media in Iran have emphasized “powerful warnings” sent to the US. Vatan-e Emrouz headlined in mid-July that short-range Iranian Tondar missiles had been “as close as 500 meters to the USS New Orleans” – an amphibious assault ship deployed in the Persian Gulf at the time.

With evident relish, the conservative Kayhan newspaper quoted a Washington Times headline from late August, saying that “confrontations reveal Obama’s nuclear deal having little effect on Iran’s behavior.”
Challenging Rouhani

Such a result is a domestic challenge for Mr. Rouhani, who has in the past questioned IRGC timing of ballistic missile tests as provocative. Analysts say current IRGC actions send a deliberate message to Rouhani, who is under fire from rivals in advance of May 2017 presidential elections.

“After Mr. Rouhani tried to limit missile tests, the IRGC itself wants to show it is still doing its duties, to say, ‘Even if the [Rouhani] government is trusting the US, we don’t trust them,’ ” says Mojtaba Mousavi, the founder of the conservative IransView.com website.

Mr. Khamenei and the establishment “feel the danger,” he says, pointing to the example of Iraq and Libya, which both took steps to accede to US and Western demands, only to be later attacked.

“When the leader says you can’t trust the US, we can’t limit the military, because the US is waiting for the opportunity to weaken us,” says Mr. Mousavi.

Analysts note that the incidents come amid a debate in Iran about reducing military spending, even as Iran is deeply engaged in costly wars in Syria and Iraq as well as Yemen. Mr. Khamenei has firmly backed a strong military, dismissing suggestions that high defense spending should give way to a future of diplomacy only.

Indeed, when Rouhani ally and former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani tweeted last March that the future was a “world of discourse, not of missiles,” Khamenei responded that such talk might be “treason,” adding: “Today it is a time for both negotiations and missiles.”
The flashpoint

The Persian Gulf is one of the few places where the US-Iran standoff has periodically turned hot. Toward the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, an Iranian mine heavily damaged a US ship, prompting the US to strike two Iranian oil facilities and sink several Iranian vessels. Few Iranians forget the accidental downing of an Iran Air civilian plane by the USS Vincennes in 1988, killing all 290 passengers, because it was mistaken for an attacking Iranian jet fighter.

The political standoff in Iran is reflected in “a strategic gap” between hardliners and Rouhani and his allies, says Qaidaari of CSS. Hardliners see the US presence through the prism of a threat, with US bases dotted across the region and “an attack policy for three decades, so [therefore] we can attack them, and we are able to, with our surface-to-sea missiles and fast-attack boats.”

The Rouhani side asks, “Why should there be this conflict in the Persian Gulf, with very serious potential for battle between Iran and the US and its allies?” adds Qaidaari. “There is only one way to change, to pay attention to common interests and not ideological policies.”

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2016/0919/Persian-Gulf-incidents-spike-sending-message-from-Iran-hardliners

By Tim Hepher

Iran urged the United States on Sunday to remove remaining obstacles to buying passenger planes following the lifting of international sanctions and it spread out the welcome mat to foreign investors as it seeks to boost its aviation sector. Read More »