BY MICHAEL MORELL AND ADM. JAMES A. “SANDY” WINNEFELD JR., USN (RET.) — 07/14/
President Trump has said that a U.S.-Iranian military conflict “wouldn’t last very long,” implying that the U.S. would emerge triumphant with minimal costs. While the president is correct that a fight most likely would end quickly and the U.S. would dominate it, the short- and long-term damage to U.S. interests would be devastating.
Neither Iran nor the United States seemingly wants a military conflict, but that does not mean one could not happen. Indeed, the likelihood of such a conflict is higher today than at any time since 2011, when Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu seemed intent on a massive strike on Iran’s nuclear program, which could have drawn the U.S. into war.
A conflict likely would begin with an Iranian provocation that trips U.S. tolerance, triggering an attack to deter Iran from further provocations. Iran would see this as disproportionate, and the response would quickly escalate. This would be a “fight tonight” war, without a weeks- or months-long buildup of U.S. forces; the U.S. would fight with what it has in the region.
Iran’s strategic goals would be to gain sanctions relief by demonstrating its ability to impact the global economy through control over the Strait of Hormuz; dividing the U.S. from the rest of the world; and gaining international stature by humiliating the U.S. — all while avoiding any internal threat to its regime. U.S. goals would be to bring Iran on its knees to the negotiating table; uphold freedom of navigation; prevent attacks on the U.S. itself; reduce Iran’s capacity to threaten its neighbors; prevent Iran from restarting its nuclear weapons program — and to do all of this with traditional allies and partners.
Though fictitious, here is what such a conflict might look like:
Iran announces that, based on illegal U.S. sanctions and recent provocations, the Strait of Hormuz is closed and it will attack any ships, military or commercial, attempting to transit it.
Dozens of Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy (IRGCN) small, fast boats immediately begin searching for ships that have not exited the strait. They conduct limited attacks, to avoid a major oil spill, on several commercial tankers, capturing one and taking its crew into custody. Iranian missile sites, many in caves or bunkers along the Strait of Hormuz, are activated. A single missile is fired at and hits a tanker; the crew abandons ship and is captured by Iranian boats. A number of Iranian vessels trying to lay mines in the strait are sunk by aircraft from the U.S. carrier on station outside the gulf, but others offload their mines.
Maritime insurance rates for the region skyrocket, turning away all commercial traffic.
Elsewhere, Iranian La Combattante and Houdong missile boats get underway from Bushehr in the northern gulf and Bandar Abbas in the south, searching for U.S. ships to attack. Although most U.S. combatants have moved to safety on the opposite side of the gulf, and several Iranian boats are detected and sunk by U.S. air power, a few missiles are fired and shot down by shipboard defenses. However, a large group of IRGCN boats finds a U.S. guided-missile destroyer and attacks it. Many of these boats are destroyed, but one launches a torpedo that severely damages the destroyer.
When Qatar refuses Iranian demands that it deny permission for U.S. aircraft to operate from Al Udeid Air Base, Iran launches a barrage of ballistic missiles at the base. Many are downed by U.S. anti-missile systems, but several get through and cause limited damage. Ballistic missiles are launched at Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain and other bases in the region with similar results.
The U.S. launches Tomahawk cruise missiles and other weapons at all known Iranian air defense and command-and-control facilities along the Gulf coast. Facilities that store nautical mines, as well as two Russia-supplied Iranian Kilo submarines moored in Bandar Abbas, are targeted. Missiles are launched against military airfields at Bandar Abbas and Bushehr inside the Arabian Gulf, and at Jask and Chah Bahar outside the gulf. The remaining Kilo submarine gets underway from Bandar Abbas, is quickly found by a U.S. submarine, and sunk.
Once Iranian regional air defenses are rendered inoperable, the U.S. begins systematically targeting known IRGC and military capability in the Arabian Gulf region using carrier- and land-based air power. Targets include missile sites, ships and boats, command-and-control facilities, military aircraft and logistics capability. Iranian military capabilities degrade rapidly.
In response, Iran launches medium-range missiles at energy infrastructure targets in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar. The conflict expands geographically when the U.S. attacks these missile bases.
Iranian proxies in Iraq and Afghanistan hit U.S. bases and diplomatic facilities with suicide attacks and rockets, resulting in U.S. casualties. Lebanese Hezbollah demurs on Iran’s demand that the group attack Israel, not wanting a war that would destroy much of its military capability. Instead, the group conducts deniable pre-planned terrorist attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets around the world. The FBI, working with the intelligence community, thwarts two such attacks in the U.S.
As the conflict escalates, Iran initiates cyber attacks against key U.S. financial targets, such as online banking services, ATM machines, and credit card servicing networks. Some of these attacks are successful but most are mitigated by cyber security investments the financial services sector made. Cyber attacks are conducted against sectors of the U.S. power grid; some are successful but quickly mitigated by physical overrides. Several gulf nations report cyber attacks on their oil infrastructure.
The conflict causes the price of oil to skyrocket to more than $250, and global financial markets decline sharply. With China in the lead, Russia and the European Union call for an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council and urge a ceasefire. Iran immediately agrees because of the devastation of its military and the sense that it has gained the moral high ground. The U.S. vetoes the measure but, because of the impact on financial markets and massive diplomatic pressure, quickly negotiates a ceasefire behind the scenes, with Oman acting as intermediary.
Indeed, the conflict does not last long — only four days. Although Iran is militarily defeated, neither side achieves all of its objectives. Because of extensive damage to regional oil infrastructure, and the effort required to sweep mines in the Strait of Hormuz, the price of oil stays well above $150 a barrel. Russia increases oil output and becomes the big economic winner. More broadly, the global economy, showing signs of weakness before the war, slips into a recession. Political divisiveness within the U.S. deepens as each side fiercely levels blame for the debacle. As the economic impact cascades, particularly in the U.S. heartland, the president loses the 2020 election.
U.S. standing in the world is deeply degraded. Even though Iran took the first shot, outrage is expressed at the U.S. by even its closest allies for creating the conditions for conflict and for its subsequent escalation and economic impact. The perception that the U.S. is too quick to use military power rises to levels not seen since the Iraq war. The U.S. loses a significant measure of global influence to China, which portrays itself as a source of world stability. Most of the G-20 nations begin to align around further reducing dependency on the dollar as the global economy’s reserve currency, with a goal of not allowing U.S. unilateral sanctions to define their foreign policies.
In Iran, the conflict knits the population together politically, deeply undermining any “moderate” factions. There is some debate about the way forward, but policy quickly coalesces around the views of the hardliners, who were angered by the original nuclear agreement, which is now in tatters. A decision is made to expeditiously build a nuclear weapon, leveraging several covert, dispersed enrichment sites of which the U.S. and its allies are unaware. Iran’s goal is to never allow such an attack on Iran again. In 2022, a nuclear test is detected that originates beneath the remote Dasht-e-Kavir desert in Iran.
Michael Morell, a career intelligence official, served as the deputy director of the CIA from 2010 to 2013. Adm. James A. “Sandy” Winnefeld, a career naval officer, was the ninth vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, serving from 2011 to 2015.
Moscow has a vested interest in the state of affairs in the Persian Gulf; it has tried its best to contain the impact that the U.S.-Iranian crisis could have on its own national security.
Will Iran crack under American pressure? Don’t count on it. Iran has grown accustomed to living under America’s recent economic sanctions and continues to pursue its own policies at home and abroad despite the restrictions associated with the latest U.S.-Iranian crisis. Tehran can rely on substantial domestic support and has a large army—including auxiliary paramilitary Basij forces—with access to air fleet, heavy forces and undersea arms. It also has revolutionary guards trained in unconventional warfare. Despite the impact of U.S. sanctions on the Iranian economy and the discontent among the citizenry, there has been no legitimate challenge to the country’s theocracy. In fact, the tension between the United States and Iran may drag on, which would require both regional and international players to permanently remain on alert. For example, due to Iran’s proximity to its borders, Russia has a vested interest in the state of affairs in Western Asia; it has tried its best to contain the impact that the U.S.-Iranian crisis could have on its own national security. As a result, the foreign policy Russia has applied toward the crisis can be divided into three main areas of focus.
The first area of focus is directly related to the size of Russia’s Muslim population and its ability to influence political processes in the country. These days there are about twenty million Muslims in Russia, a figure that has doubled within the span of three decades. Russia needs to prevent this population from being lumped into radical nationalist groups while at the same time representing their interests. Thus, Russia is concerned that the West—or even Iran—might have the power to provoke political and social unrest amid different groups of that Muslim population. In the past, Western countries have been suspected of supporting these and other radical groups on Russian territory. Moscow is also concerned about the possibility that a Shia and the Sunni confrontation could erupt on its soil and that one of those groups would receive support from Iran. It does not want to become a battlefield in the struggle between different religions. At the same time, Russia doesn’t want to ruin its relationship with the United States.
The second area of focus is concentrated on the areas that Russia sees as a part of its sphere of influence, such as post-Soviet countries like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, and other countries of the region where Moscow is very popular especially among some political and economic elites. These elites believe that Russia can help them combat the influence of radical political Islam. At the same time, these countries have traditionally strong ties to Iran. Due to this intersection of historical, diplomatic, and economic ties, the region is an area of mutual interest to both the Russians and Iranians. Cooperation between the two countries mostly centers around the Caucasus, Caspian and Central Asian regions. Russia has a long-term project, known as the greater Eurasia partnership, and Iran is a project participant. Russia tries to sell project participants on the idea that the project is a good alternative to further expansion of the West, which may cost them their national identities.
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The third area of focus is connected with overlapping humanitarian and economic concerns that impact both Russia and Iran. These concerns have been footholds in the history of mutual relationships since the time of Russian and Persian empires. Nowadays both of the countries are trying to compensate for their failures by pursuing policies that promote their own and unique civilizations. In this situation the humanitarian sphere is one of the strategic ones allowing to pursue long-term aims. Of note, Russian-Iranian educational and cultural projects have doubled since the Trump administration announced its strategy for Iran. While the United States has been focused on “bringing Iran to its knees,” Russia has been focused on the future. Economic ties between these two countries have been strengthening over the past few years, with bilateral trade reaching $2 billion in 2018.
Hopefully, Russia and Iran will maintain a positive relationship despite their differences and past difficulties. For example, in 2016 Russian forces were pushed off of a military base in Iran that it had used to conduct military operations in Syria. The strategic shift happened after the Iranians squabbled over whether foreign forces should be allowed to use an Iranian military base. Also, the two countries have had some disputes over the fate of Syria. Despite these issues, Russia maintains a positive relationship with Iran, which it further confirmed during a June 25 meeting between national security advisers John Bolton, Meir Ben-Shabbat and Nikolai Patrushev. During the meeting, Patrushev, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, declared that Russia would continue to accommodate Iran’s interests in the Middle East because it remains “the ally and partner” of choice in Syria. Both countries are focused on preventing further destabilization in the region, he said.
In conclusion, Russia wants to retain its position as a geopolitical player and influence the Muslim world, but it doesn’t want to get involved in the conflicts associated with that world. Thus, although Moscow’s leaders have valid concerns about the Middle East, they continue to see the benefits of maintaining strategic partnerships with various countries in the region. It is through these partnerships that they hope to gauge how much the Trump administration is willing to pay in order to achieve its goals.
Nadya Glebova is a fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, a MENA researcher.
Ardeshir Zahedi is Iran’s former foreign minister (1966-1971) and ambassador to England (1962-1966) and United States (1960-1962 and 1973-1979). Ali Vaez is the International Crisis Group’s Iran project director, based in Washington.
We belong to two very different generations of Iranians. One of us served in senior official positions in the pro-Western monarchy that ruled Iran prior to the 1979 Islamic revolution; the other is a child of that revolution. One presided over the golden ageof Iran-U.S. relations; the other was subject to years of state-sponsored anti-American indoctrination. Yet, despite these differences, we share a sense of belonging to both countries and grave concerns about the collision course they are on.
The Trump administration seems to believe it can achieve what has eluded its predecessors for four decades: fundamental change in Tehran. It has resorted to a time-worn set of tools to attain this objective: strangling the Iranian economy through sanctions, destabilizing Iran by supporting dissidents and secessionists, and launching an information war against the leadership in Tehran. It appears convinced that exercising what it calls “maximum pressure” will cause Iranian capitulation or regime collapse.
The Iranian people, meanwhile, strive for democracy as they have for more than a century, amid growing discontent over endemic corruption, repression and environmental degradation. They deserve a government that respects their rights, preserves their dignity, and offers them peace and a chance at prosperity. Washington’s belligerence, however, could once again bring their democratic struggle to grief. This is for several reasons.
First, the Trump administration has very little credibility as the would-be standard-bearer of positive change. Its rhetoric promising to “crush” Iran or usher in “the official end of Iran” through military action belies its professed distinction between the leadership and the Iranian people.
The administration’s list of public missteps toward the Iranian people is as long as it is regrettable. It includes preventing almost all Iranians from visiting the United States;misstatingthe historic name of the Persian Gulf; failing to express sympathy with Iranians after terrorist attacks by the Islamic State and separatist groups; and, perhaps most consequentially, withdrawing from the nuclear deal that remains popular in Iran and to which many there had pinned their hopes for a better life.
These mistakes have helped transform top-down anti-Americanism in Iran into a bottom-up phenomenon. Nothing spurs a rally-around-the-flag effect among 83 million Iranians more than humiliation and threats of foreign aggression.
How can Iranians buy into the administration’s professions of positive intent when Washington selectively decries their leaders’ corruption and human rights violations while overlooking the same behavior among U.S. allies? Why didn’t President Trump ask his North Korean or Russian counterparts to fundamentally reorient their policies before he would engage them in fruitless pageantry?
The administration’s Iran policy is not a strategy. It is a pressure tactic wrapped in bellicosity folded inside a chimera. It is bereft of a viable vision and based on the naive assumption that overthrowing the Islamic republic will miraculously lead to a pluralistic and pro-American order. That previous U.S.-sponsored regime change in the region has ushered in failed states or worse autocracies seems to be an afterthought.
Even when the administration seems to vie for rapprochement, it is unconvincingly inconsistent. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo says, “We are prepared to engage in a conversation [with Iran] with no preconditions,” but in the same news conference , he goes on to say that would happen only “when the Iranians can prove that they want to behave like a normal nation.” This kind of double-speak and condescension does not instill trust.
The suffocating sanctions that the United States is slapping unilaterally on Iran have pushed the country into a deep inflationary recession, impoverishing its middle class and enriching state-affiliated actors, especially men with guns and experience in circumventing restrictions. This could lead to one of two outcomes: a weakened Iranian society, in which making ends meet will overshadow any quest for liberty; or a blind, desperate revolt that ends either in a brutal crackdown or a bloody civil war.
Either scenario will leave behind a broken, radicalized and militarized Iran, perhaps entrenching the Islamic republic’s most hard-line elements. How does that temper Iran’s behavior? How is that in the United States’ interest?
Bullying and crude threats will achieve little beyond entangling the United States and the region in another senseless war while deepening the two countries’ 40-year estrangement. The United States should strive for an Iran that is stable with a strong middle class and highly educated youths connected to the moderating influence of the outside world. The Iranian people want to restore the friendship between Iran and the United States, two countries that enjoyed 123 years of cordial ties before 1979. But the path to their hearts and minds is not through sanctions and military intervention.
It is not too late for this administration to cease demonizing and threatening Iran, and step aside from its maximalist demands. One of Iran’s most renowned poets, Rumi, offers a better way forward: “Out beyond ideas of wrong-doing and right-doing, there is a field. I’ll meet you there.”
Professor Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh’s remarks at the second international symposium of “Herat School of Security”
From security from above to security from below
We are witnessing an unsettling amount of tensions at the global level, in our region, our state and our societies, and ultimately in our families and communities. We gather in various conferences to seek solutions about what factors can bring security and how peace can be brought to our lands and our homes.
From a macro perspective, recalling that Afghanistan is strategically located between the interests of global powers, and given the presence of international terror groups on Afghan land (Al Qaeda before and now ISIS-Khorasan province), we argue that peace depends on the will of global actors.
From a regional perspective, we argue, like I did in my latest book co-authored with Kristian Harpviken, that conflict in Afghanistan is the projection of the rivalries between countries stuck in three regional security complexes: South Asia, Persian Gulf and Central Asia. Peace then depends on solving regional problems first or ensuring that neighbors do not interfere in Afghan affairs. From a regional perspective, we also argue that peace also depends on the extend of cooperation between the states of the region to defeat the common scourge, violent extremism, terrorism, transnational criminal networks etc.
From a national security perspective, we argue that peace in Afghanistan depends on the degree of power-sharing that can be negotiated between the Afghan government and the spoilers of peace, ranging from insurgents to opposition groups. From a societal perspective, the question becomes how much, ultimately, the values of liberal, modern and progressive Afghan civil society and of women’s right can be reconciled with the more traditional values of groups such as the Taliban that have stayed outside of the liberal peacebuilding project of the past 15 years and want now to be included.
All these ‘conditionalities’ for peace in Afghanistan have one thing in common: they treat the peace project as something exogenous to Afghans, as if it were a gift that could be brought, or taken away, by external actors, i.e. the Americans, neighboring countries, Daesh, drug networks etc. or by institutions, i.e. the army, the police, the state, the international community etc.
But a number of questions come to mind: Why do we seek the source of peace outside of ourselves? Why do we expect security to be provided by institutions and by external factors when we refuse to see the violence in our society, our families and in our own hearts? What is our own contribution, starting from making peace with ourselves and in ourselves? It is obvious that a new security paradigm is necessary, one that does not descend upon us from the international system, down to the region, down to the state, but one that springs up from us, and more precisely, from our hearts.
A partial answer was given in 1994 when the concept of Human Security was coined in the UNDP Human Development Report. It followed the assumption that in some circumstances the state is unwilling or unable to provide security for its people, and by consequence, uphold its social contract to protect its citizens. Hence, the concept of human security reminds us that the security of the state is not an end in itself, but a means to the security of individuals. The state is responsible not just to protect its territory from other states, but also to ensure the survival, livelihoods and dignity of its citizens.
Yet, even this concept of human security is not enough to guide personal behavior in a way that individuals, me and you, can contribute to creating peace from below, from within society. It is high time to develop an alternative concept of security based on values of humanity and empathy, a security that is not only ‘human’ (Ensan Mehvar) but also ‘humane’ (ba shafaghat, Rahim).
A security paradigm to tackle the crisis of violence
Why do we consistently seek the foreign sources of political and financial support to the creation and sustaining of violent extremist groups such as Daesh, but tend to ignore what should be done to defeat the phenomenon of ‘Daeshism’, a metaphor for radicalization, that has domestic and local roots? The problem of insecurity in the region starts with the problem of violence – and tolerance for violence – in society.
Rethinking the concept of security is necessary to tackle an unprecedented crisis of violence that we are witnessing everywhere, in our families, in our television sets, etc. It suffices to see the extremely violent video games that children are playing to understand the immunity to violence that has been cultivated in our societies. Recall the images of the cubs of caliphate, the little 10 year old boys that were groomed as the next generation fighters by ISIS in Syria, shooting at point blank their Kurdish prisoners. Did you see the ISIS father who proudly posted a picture of his child holding the head of a female Peshmerga fighter by her long braid?
It is easy to blame radicalization and violent extremism on manipulations by external interest groups and states. But how can we explain what draws people to such violent groups as Daesh? Between 3000 to 5000 people from the Central Asian republics left to join ISIS at the height of their power in territories they controlled in Syria and Iraq. Even if 80 percent were actually recruited while they were migrant workers in Russia, even if monetary incentives may have played a role, and even if they believed that they would be contributing to state building and not fighting, there is no denying that they left having already seen on TV and heard about the atrocities that this ultra violent group was committing. What explains this preponderance to violence if not a crisis of identity, a lacunae of morality, a different type of value on life and understanding of violence.
Forgotten Islam
As Ostad Akbar (RIP) mentioned during the 2015 conference as his last public appearance before his demise a week later, the messages of Islam, and the principles of Islam (Osoul-i Islami) have been forgotten. Today, religion has become an exercise in submission, figh and laws, Forgotten in the discourses of dogmas and restrictions, are the ethical doctrines of how to lead a moral, kind and compassionate life.
The harsh adaptation of Islamic principles, without the essence of love, can lead to lack of proper thinking, a culture of exclusion and obedience: Those who follow the dogmas and the others. It leads to sectarianism, takfiri ideology which prescribes lack of tolerance for the other. If the culture of violence is widespread in the region, it is a manifestation of the crisis of values and spirituality in society. The true essence of religion, embodied in the ethic of doing good and loving God, has been silenced between two extremes: Fanatism and reactionary secularism.
Kindness
The vacuum of spirituality which is at the source of violence, is not only a problem of Muslim societies. The West is similarly undergoing a crisis of ideology, identity and philosophy. The roots of violence are the same everywhere: lack of knowledge about the self, decrease of kindness, affection, tenderness. Ultimately, the roots of violence lay in the death – or at least the deficit – of love. The remedy is what the French call “emerveillement”, a spiritual awakening and awareness of the healing power of love. If radicalization starts in the mind, it may perhaps be defeated with love that springs from the heart.
Closer to home, in our own Sufi tradition we would call it “kashf” (unveiling), awakening to the knowledge of the heart rather than of the intellect. Uncovering the heart in order to allow divine truths to pour into it. It is, simply put, the ultimate experience of falling in love. Hence, the esoteric facet of Islam, embodied in mystic traditions, has the potential to encourage the development of a personal moral code of conduct that can be transmitted in society as a practical remedy against extremism and violence. In sum, reviving spiritual values in society is proposed as a panacea to the vacuum and lacunae of morality that is being manifested in violence in society. Unveiling love (kashf e eshq) can be, and should be, a down-to-earth principle of compassionate relations between people, based on kindness, dignity and empathy, a guide to behavior that is arefaneh (mystical) and asheghaneh (loving) and an alternative to relations in society that are based on power.
Is Sufism the answer?
Five years ago, I proposed the renewal of spiritual values of the esoteric face of Islam, embodied in Sufism, as the basis of a new concept of humane security at the Herat Security Dialogues held by AISS. This because I believed that the tradition of Khorasani erfan, the Sufism that sprang out in this region and which had developed distinguished features from the school of mysticism that was found in centers closer to the caliphate, in Bagdad and in Basra, was an adept source for non-violence. The Sufism of Greater Khorasan approached the divine through acts of devotion, exaltation and love, as opposed to the sober rituals and observation that were the features of formal Islamic theology and shariat law. Humane security could draw its inspiration from the distinct culture of Persianate Sufism which cultivated the art of esthetics, expressed through poetry, moral etiquette (adab) coupled with service to others and chivalry as an ethical duty (javanmardi or Futuwat).
With such a heritage, reviving the values of Sufism seemed to be logical enough as an ethic of non-violence. In my mind, Khorasani Sufism held a great potential in developing a personal code of moral conduct based not on the fear of God and fear of transgression of rules, like in orthodox Islam, but of love of God that could be transmitted in society as a personal ethic of compassion, a practical remedy to extremism and violence.
But it was not as simple a proposition as it seemed. Both during the first Herat Security conference in 2015 and in subsequent discussions I held, the reaction to “Sufism” was not negligible.
During the conference of three years ago, a number of Afghan intellectuals debunked the return to the values of Islam as recidivism, criticizing it as an attempt to keep society backwards. They warned against a nostalgia or worship of the past (gozashteh parasti) or rojou be gozashteh especially a past that was not always peaceful. They associated reviving Sufi values with being anti-modern, and denying the forces of modernization and secularism. Instead, they encouraged efforts towards reviving wisdom (kherad) and creating a system based on aghl, logic and reasoning. They insisted on philosophy as a more suited theoretical and practical discipline towards the realization of “true happiness” in Afghanistan, that of enlightenment.
The philosophers sought to juxtapose reason (as a philosophy of the future which uses logic, facts, rationality and the intellect) and erfan, (which they saw as an ideology of the past, which embraces the unknown, the gnostic, intuition) etc. But philosophy without the sacred is not adapted for a peaceful, more humane world. While appeals to the brain may attract the more educated part of the population, the call to the heart definitely touches more people. Love speaks to all of us, while wisdom to only some of us.
Others preferred to seek answers to non-violence in the common culture, literature and history of the region. From the example of the non-violent actions of Ghaffar Khan Badshah (the Frontier Ghandi) to Rumi’s poems, the region is strife with cultural references and heroes that can be followed as ethical guidance (rahnamay akhlaghi). The literary heritage of the region, some argued, is rich enough to be used for any queries towards self-knowledge (khod shenasi) and becoming the perfect human (ensan kamel).
However, as Afghan society is deeply religious, and Central Asian societies are becoming increasingly so, values of non-violence ought to be sought within Islam. At a time when wrong and narrow interpretations of Islam in the hands of some irresponsible clerics are planting the seeds of intolerance and violence, the question is what could calm passions and bring back the essence of religion as a force of good in society. Reviving Sufi values and the love of God is not about replacing Islam but ensuring that the precepts of the essence of religion are respected and implemented.
A number of critiques were weary about the revival of Sufism as a new form of governance. Will neo-Sufism play a role in religious practices in society or will it interfere in politics? Will it be limited to creating a culture of non-violence or does it have ambitions as a new order or political system? This question bothered some participants who were questioning the legitimacy of the system of theocracy as a political model (like in Iran), and others who had mixed experience with the political role of Sufi groups in contemporary politics (like in Afghanistan). The answer of course would be any potential revival of Sufi values (arzeshhay erfani) is not for a new nezam (political order), but for akhlaq (morality) and tarbiat-e ensan (education and moral education of humanity).
Other criticisms endured: Some commentators were weary about reactionary escapism that Sufism seemed to prescribe from real world. They wondered whether the solution to confrontation of violence in society could be really be withdrawal from the world (tark-e donya or donya gorizi), forgetting that not all Sufi orders require withdrawal from society. In fact, orders such as the Naqshbandi require Khalwat dar Jamiat, the possibility to be within oneself in society. Adopting spirituality does not require tark-e-donya but integrating values of spirituality in daily life.
Towards a Humane Security
Developing and implementing the concept of Humane Security rests on the proposition to revive the values of Sufism and not its practices necessarily, which obviously depends on the different orders (tariqa/turuq). At the heart of these values, and common to all the different orders and interpretations, is the supremacy of love. By itself Sufism is about self-effacement. Humane security goes beyond the imperative to do to others what you want to be done to yourself, which is a utilitarian approach to human interactions. Instead, it is about selfless love for the other as the embodiment of the love of god on earth.
What are some of the humane Sufi values that could translate into an ethic of non-violence?
Love: Anyone who loves God cannot do harm to the creatures that God has created. Love also means knowing the other and loving humanity (Ensan dousti).
Unity: Within the Sufi belief of Wahdat ul Wujud, human beings are united in one being. As a result, harm cannot be done to others, as they are part of oneself.
Sincere service to others. The Sufi belief in Futuwat (or Javanmardi) requires service to the disenfranchised in society, caring for others, and doing something to improve their lives, which is at the opposite spectrum of violence.
Selflessness (Az khod gozashtegi) requires empathy with others and attention to their predicament.
The search for truth (Haq) brings a person to honesty and a host of humane qualities: Forgiveness, understanding of others, empathy, compassion, kindness, truth saying, veracity, righteousness, forgetting and kineh douri, bakhshayeh absolution, staying away from hatred (douri az kineh) etc. It is also an exercise in taking responsibility for one’s actions and relying upon oneself.
Submitting to the love of god makes one forget the ego and creates peace in the heart, which is the first panacea for non-violence. Making peace with oneself then can become the peace of society.
Dialogue: Acceptance of the other (digar parasti), and the possibility of negotiations leads to tolerance and is against the very principle of takfir. ghaboul diagram, baray tavahom and ijad goftegu. Giving presence (hasti) to the other when they are there by accepting them and listening to them is the basis of dialogue.
These values and acts are supposed to lead to a personal ethic that creates the necessary impetus – that energy of love –for thinking good, doing good and saying good (associated with the Zoroastrian maxim of pendare niq, kerdar and afkar-e niq, Humata, Hukhta, Huvarshta ). The personal ethic of becoming human (adam shodan, ensan boudan) then leads to humanism, and humanism to non-violence.
Where do we go from here?
Rethinking security by putting the values of love and non-violence in the heart of Asia, as Afghanistan had been called in the poems of Allama Muhammad Iqbal Lahore (d. 1938), could transform the region from a center of fundamentalism to a catalyzer for peace.
The concept of humane security ultimately softens politics by interjecting some soul (rouh) into rational calculations of security (Aql). It counters violence, hatred and, ultimately, male pride (ghorour mardaneh) with a feminine elegance subtlety (latofat zanona) coupled with a poetic sense (hes-e shaeranieh).
Assuming that such a goal is established, as to try to operationalize this concept in Afghanistan, what are the next steps?
One way would be to launch a nation wide project where young people are paired with figures of moral authority (elders, pirs, tribal leaders, etc.). Together, they would choose the messages of peace and tolerance from the religious and cultural heritage (pand-eh niagan) which can then be disseminated among youth using modern means of communication (social media, education system etc.).
Another way could be to launch a conversation, using media and social media, of what the concept of love means for different people (youth, scholars, practitioners, military officials, Taliban, bureaucrats, housewives, etc.). What does it mean to love? How can we become more generous, grateful, and forgiving? The idea would be to see how these and other values are internalized and strengthened, and how they advance the cause of non-violence and shape the sense of meaning and purpose. The idea would also be to show the similarities of experiences, inspirations and ultimately, hope for peace in society.
Opening up such conversations in society could start eventually a movement of consciousness towards the need to recreate security from below, based not on guns but on the protective and nurturing power of love.
Professor Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh is member of AISS advisory board and Professor of Human Security at Sciences Po, Paris.
CHICAGO (The Borowitz Report)—In an appearance at the University of Chicago on Monday, former President Barack Obama unloaded a relentless barrage of complete sentences in what was widely seen as a brutal attack on his successor, Donald Trump.
Appearing at his first public event since leaving office, Obama fired off a punishing fusillade of grammatically correct sentences, the likes of which the American people have not heard from the White House since he departed.
“He totally restricted his speech to complete sentences,” Tracy Klugian, a student at the event, said. “It was the most vicious takedown of Trump I’d ever seen.”
“About five or six sentences in, I noticed that all of his sentences had both nouns and verbs in them,” Carol Foyler, another student, said. “I couldn’t believe he was going after Trump like that.”
Obama’s blistering deployment of complete sentences clearly got under the skin of their intended target, who, moments after the event, responded with an angry tweet: “Obama bad (or sick) guy. Failing. Sad!”
In tonight’s program we will look at the continued tension between Tehran and Washington over the issue of Iran scaling down on its commitments within the nuclear deal with the international community.
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