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by Paul R. Pillar 20 September 2016

The unrelenting urge among American politicians to keep punishing Iran—or more precisely, to be seen supporting steps with that objective—continues to work against sensible statecraft and U.S. interests in multiple respects. One of those respects concerns how measures taken by the United States affect political competition within Iran.

Here’s the current background to questions of U.S. policy toward Iran. The most important development in recent years regarding such policy—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the formal name for the agreement that limits Iran’s nuclear activity—has been in effect for over a year. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which does the detailed monitoring of the Iranian program, Iran is fully in compliance with its obligations under the agreement. Those in the United States who have opposed any agreement with Iran all along continue to seek any possible basis for accusing Iran of violations. One of the most recent such accusations concerned some issues of implementation that opponents described as “secret exceptions” granted to Iran. They were in fact not that but rather were typical of the detailed questions that inevitably arise in implementation of any agreement this extensive. A Joint Commission was created under the agreement precisely to resolve such questions, and it has successfully been doing exactly that. The principal real questions of adherence to the agreement involve whether the United States and the West have been fully living up to their obligations regarding sanctions relief and refraining from further steps to damage the Iranian economy.

Despite the record of Iranian compliance, the months since conclusion of the JCPOA have seen a stream of anti-Iran bills introduced in Congress. Examination of most of these bills yields little idea of how if they were to come into effect they would advance any U.S. interests pertinent to Iran, and little evidence of any thought that in this respect went into the writing of the bills. The bills instead seem to be vehicles for members to demonstrate, through their sponsorship or support of such legislation, their anti-Iran credentials.

Typical of these proposals is a recent amendment introduced by Representative Ron DeSantis (R-FL) that would require any issuer of securities, as it registers with the Securities and Exchange Commission, to declare in its registration statement whether it does business in Iran or with any entity organized under the laws of Iran. Although this may sound like an innocent requirement for information, existing law already requires such a disclosure by issuers of securities with regard to any business done with the government of Iran, the Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Iranian central bank, the entire Iranian petroleum industry, and certain other Iranian individuals and entities subject to sanctions. So the DeSantis amendment would only serve to impose the reporting requirement on those dealing with portions of the Iranian private sector that not only have no connection with the Iranian regime but also have given no reason to be sanctioned in the long history of U.S. sanctions legislation directed against Iran. This would discourage commerce with the very sectors in Iran that are most in favor of peaceful engagement with the rest of the world. The legislation would be counterproductive with regard to any political and economic evolution in Iran in a direction favorable to U.S. interests. (The legislation also probably would violate the U.S. obligation under the JCPOA not to take any new steps to prevent Iran from realizing the economic benefits of sanctions relief.)

Another recent example of a backward approach to affecting political competition within Iran is aninterview with Dennis Ross of the Washington Institute for New East Policy. Ross, operating squarely within the school of thought that sees nothing good coming out of any business with Tehran and who sees Iran only as an object for confrontation and punishment, focuses on Iran’s conduct within the Middle East. As usual with that topic and that school of thought, there are many general references to Iranian “aggression” without considering exactly what Iran is or is not doing in the region and why, say, Iranian assistance to an incumbent regime in Syria is any more “aggressive” than what other powers have been doing to stoke a rebellion and to try to overthrow the regime. And Ross’s attempt to square his position that Iran “cannot be a partner in the struggle against ISIS” with the fact that in Iraq, Iran is, just like the United States, not only supporting the incumbent regime but also actively opposing ISIS, seems to come down to an assertion that the Iranians are following narrow (undescribed) policies in Iraq that will leave a lot of angry Sunnis on their Western doorstep but evidently are too stupid to realize that is what they are doing.

For the present purpose note what Ross says about the connection between U.S. actions and political contests within the Iranian regime. He says we should try to decrease the influence of General Soleimani and the Revolutionary Guard, who favor a more “confrontational approach,” relative to the influence of president Rouhani, who favors more of a “normalizing approach.” So far so good. But how is the United States supposed to affect that Iranian political balance? Ross says we should do it by being confrontational ourselves—by “applying pressure”that would “demonstrate the costs to Iran of Soleimani’s actions.” When asked what this means in practical terms, Ross mentions military contingency planning with Israel and the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Let’s see if we have this straight. We supposedly are all agreed that we would like to see less influence in Tehran for hardliners such as those centered in the Revolutionary Guard. Those hardliners are the ones who, in debate within Iran, argue that doing peaceful business with the United States (as with the JCPOA) does not bring any benefits to Iran, that the United States is determined to use its military might and other power to harm Iran, that Washington will always be acting in cahoots with Iran’s regional rivals in Israel and the Gulf Arab states, and that Iran thus has to stand firm and tough against such predatory U.S. behavior in order to protect Iranian interests. So acting in a way that confirms the hardliners’ narrative is supposed to reduce their influence in Tehran? The groundlessness of such an argument can be seen with some role reversal. Such confrontation from a foreign adversary tends to strengthen, rather than to weaken, hawkish and hardline sentiment in U.S. politics. It works pretty much the same way in Iranian politics.

The sort of illogicality voiced by Ross has some general roots in American exceptionalism and the notion that the United States should be able to push other states around but that other states don’t push the United States around. There is more to it than that, however, where Iran is involved, as suggested by comparing the Iranian case with other cases that offer some parallels. One worth looking at is Burma (a.k.a. Myanmar). President Obama announced this week that the United States is ready to lift economic sanctions on Burma, in light of political reforms there.

This decision is not an obvious call. The Burmese military, which maintained a harsh and closed dictatorship for many years, retains much political power. The former opposition leader and now de facto head of the civilian government, Aung San Suu Kyi, has made many concessions to the military and has become in important respects a partner of the generals rather than a replacement of them. The treatment of ethnic and religious minorities, most conspicuously the Muslim Rohingya community, is still bad. Human rights organizations believe the sanctions are being lifted too soon.

The U.S. administration decided, however, that enough change has taken place in Burma to warrant change in U.S. policy toward Burma. At least as important, the administration determined that further economic and political change in a favorable direction in Burma would be more likely by opening up the country to normal commerce and relations than it would by keeping it isolated.

President Obama’s Republican opponents in Congress have, on this issue, taken a constructive and balanced approach. Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell, who has had a strong interest in Burma, made remarks on the Senate floor that appropriately noted both the progress to date and the significant problems and challenges that remain.

That’s a much different approach than McConnell and his colleagues take on Iran, and it is a difference in the approach itself and not just in the two countries involved. If they applied to Burma the same perspective they apply to Iran, what we would be hearing is that moderates in Burma don’t matter, that it is nefarious hardliners who still run the show, that gross human rights violations continue, that any relief from sanctions would mean the military-dominated regime would have more resources to do bad things, and that Obama is making a big mistake by lifting sanctions.

Two explanations chiefly account for the difference. One is the objective of denying Mr. Obama any significant foreign policy achievement, consistent with Senator McConnell’s earlier declaration that the number one objective of his caucus was to deny the president a second term. The opening to Iran and the JCPOA constitute such a significant achievement; nothing the administration is doing on Burma is of comparable importance.

The other explanation is that continued isolation and punishment of Iran is part of a larger objective of the administration’s opponents of taking sides in the Middle East, and in particular to take whatever side the Israeli government is on. Ross’s mention of military contingency planning with Israel directed against Iran represents not so much a way to scare Iran about costs of General Soleimani’s activities but instead the side-taking that underlies the impulse to keep Iran perpetually isolated and punished in the first place.

And the counterproductive effect of confirming the Iranian hardliners’ narrative is not really counterproductive if the objective is to maintain Iran as a bête noire forever; if you want a bête noire, a regime in which hardliners dominate is the best kind of bête noire to have.

Photo: Ron DeSantis (R-FL) by Gage Skidmore via Flickr.

This article was first published by the National Interest and was reprinted here with permission. Copyright The National Interest.

http://lobelog.com/our-hardliners-are-still-helping-irans-hardliners/

TEHRAN, IRAN — Small Iranian fast-attack boats race toward American warships in the Persian Gulf, turning away at the last minute as warning shots are fired – just one of many recent incidents that are prompting hard-line Iranian media to crow that the US superpower has been “humiliated, again.”

In the latest episode last weekend, Iran warned two US Navy surveillance planes flying high at the edge of its territory that it would shoot them down if they entered Iranian airspace.

Iran and the US have been provoking each other militarily for more than 30 years, engaging in a volatile tug-of-war in the Persian Gulf, where one-third of the world’s seaborne oil supply travels through the Strait of Hormuz.

But threatening incidents have spiked recently, with at least 32 reported so far this year, compared with 23 in all of 2015. Gen. Joseph Votel, the head of US Central Command, said earlier this month that Iran’s moves are an attempt to “exert their influence and authority in the region.”

The US military says all recent incidents have occurred in international waters, and that such “harassment” from Iran is “unsafe and unprofessional.” Senior Iranian officers, meanwhile, downplay their actions as “routine” and defensive – but declare that a “severe” reaction will follow if they detect any aggressive US intent.

Analysts say the uptick sends two messages from Iran’s more ideologically driven Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has been engaged in a struggle for influence with the centrist President Hassan Rouhani: First, that it will challenge its superpower enemy in its own backyard, even at the risk of escalation; and second, to remind Mr. Rouhani that, despite last year’s nuclear deal with the US and global powers, the IRGC plays a key military role, and often a provocative one.

Those calculations mean that, even as all sides downplay the dangers, the Persian Gulf remains a flashpoint.

“In the Persian Gulf, any mistake by one soldier – one soldier – could raise fire across the entire Persian Gulf or Sea of Oman. We worry about that,” says Abbas Qaidaari, a military expert at the Center for Strategic Studies, a think tank attached to Iran’s presidency. “We think that any unprofessional action, by Iranian fleets or the US and its allies, will be destructive.”

That means the stakes are high for correctly interpreting the other side’s moves. The Persian Gulf encounters are “just a signal, not a realistic action and it does not reflect our real policies. The US has to listen carefully,” suggests Mr. Qaidaari.

“In any country there are hardliners, in the US, too,” says Qaidaari, who argues that the IRGC won’t hurt the US in the Persian Gulf because of national security interests. “We have this community of hardliners who maybe want a war in the Persian Gulf. But look to the commander-in-chief [Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei]: He never wanted to start a new war in the Persian Gulf.”
Recent incidents

Among recent incidents, Iran test-fired rockets near US ships last December, and an Iranian drone passed over a US aircraft carrier in January. The US Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain, frequently conducts naval exercises with Gulf allies.

Adm. Alireza Tangsiri, acting commander of the IRGC Navy, said patrolling the Persian Gulf is a “round-the-clock mission that will continue in the future” – with particular attention paid to US activity.

Iranian conservatives cite “threatening” American behavior so close to Iran’s borders, and they recall that 10 US sailors were found in Iranian waters in January; Iran briefly seized them at gunpoint. Swift direct contact between top diplomats of both nations – an informal channel created during the nuclear talks – led to a quick resolution.

But often events move too quickly in the cramped waters of the Persian Gulf to prevent an escalation, without a dedicated line of communication. IRGC war games have included targeting replica American warships with Iranian fast-attack boats and missiles.

“We definitely believe they trespassed our waters … in most [recent] cases,” says Mohsen Rezaei, a former IRGC commander and secretary of the Expediency Council, in an interview.

To Mr. Rezaei, the reason for Iran’s concern is obvious: “The security of the Persian Gulf is in fact the security of Iran.”

“There were a few cases in which our speedboats were suspicious about their activities, so they had to get closer,” says Rezaei. Iranian craft approached even when US ships were in international waters.

“Our speedboats mostly just send them a warning – they don’t actually take any action – to understand the reaction of the other side,” says Rezaei. Are those actions dangerous? “Not from our side.”

Hard-line media in Iran have emphasized “powerful warnings” sent to the US. Vatan-e Emrouz headlined in mid-July that short-range Iranian Tondar missiles had been “as close as 500 meters to the USS New Orleans” – an amphibious assault ship deployed in the Persian Gulf at the time.

With evident relish, the conservative Kayhan newspaper quoted a Washington Times headline from late August, saying that “confrontations reveal Obama’s nuclear deal having little effect on Iran’s behavior.”
Challenging Rouhani

Such a result is a domestic challenge for Mr. Rouhani, who has in the past questioned IRGC timing of ballistic missile tests as provocative. Analysts say current IRGC actions send a deliberate message to Rouhani, who is under fire from rivals in advance of May 2017 presidential elections.

“After Mr. Rouhani tried to limit missile tests, the IRGC itself wants to show it is still doing its duties, to say, ‘Even if the [Rouhani] government is trusting the US, we don’t trust them,’ ” says Mojtaba Mousavi, the founder of the conservative IransView.com website.

Mr. Khamenei and the establishment “feel the danger,” he says, pointing to the example of Iraq and Libya, which both took steps to accede to US and Western demands, only to be later attacked.

“When the leader says you can’t trust the US, we can’t limit the military, because the US is waiting for the opportunity to weaken us,” says Mr. Mousavi.

Analysts note that the incidents come amid a debate in Iran about reducing military spending, even as Iran is deeply engaged in costly wars in Syria and Iraq as well as Yemen. Mr. Khamenei has firmly backed a strong military, dismissing suggestions that high defense spending should give way to a future of diplomacy only.

Indeed, when Rouhani ally and former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani tweeted last March that the future was a “world of discourse, not of missiles,” Khamenei responded that such talk might be “treason,” adding: “Today it is a time for both negotiations and missiles.”
The flashpoint

The Persian Gulf is one of the few places where the US-Iran standoff has periodically turned hot. Toward the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, an Iranian mine heavily damaged a US ship, prompting the US to strike two Iranian oil facilities and sink several Iranian vessels. Few Iranians forget the accidental downing of an Iran Air civilian plane by the USS Vincennes in 1988, killing all 290 passengers, because it was mistaken for an attacking Iranian jet fighter.

The political standoff in Iran is reflected in “a strategic gap” between hardliners and Rouhani and his allies, says Qaidaari of CSS. Hardliners see the US presence through the prism of a threat, with US bases dotted across the region and “an attack policy for three decades, so [therefore] we can attack them, and we are able to, with our surface-to-sea missiles and fast-attack boats.”

The Rouhani side asks, “Why should there be this conflict in the Persian Gulf, with very serious potential for battle between Iran and the US and its allies?” adds Qaidaari. “There is only one way to change, to pay attention to common interests and not ideological policies.”

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2016/0919/Persian-Gulf-incidents-spike-sending-message-from-Iran-hardliners

Commandos failed to capture Recep Tayyip Erdogan at a seaside resort

By DION NISSENBAUM in Istanbul, ADAM ENTOUS in Washington July 17, 2016

A trio of Turkish helicopters filled with rebel forces buzzed the country’s Turquoise Coast below a waxing moon early Saturday as they homed in on their target: President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

For the first time in more than 35 years, members of Turkey’s military were trying to forcibly overthrow their government.

As the small group of elite Maroon Beret soldiers on the Turkish Riviera staged their make-or-break mission to try to capture or perhaps kill the country’s democratically elected president, it seemed as if the coup plotters had the upper hand.

In Istanbul, tanks commandeered by the rebels closed Istanbul’s international airport. Soldiers opened fire on Turkish teenagers storming their barricades on a vital bridge connecting the two sides of the city. F-16s attacked Turkey’s parliament building, and helicopters fired at the country’s intelligence headquarters. The country’s top general was detained at gunpoint by one of his top aides.

Yet the commandos who raided the resort where Mr. Erdogan had been staying missed their target. After a brief gunbattle with his presidential security force, the rebels were repelled. Before they ever arrived, Mr. Erdogan had slipped away.

When the sun came up Saturday, it was clear that the coup attempt had failed less than 12 hours after it had started.

The immediate result seems to be the opposite of what the coup leaders intended. Instead of weakening Mr. Erdogan, the coup provided a rationale for him to crack down on the two strongest bastions of Turkish society that had the power to check his political ambitions.

This reconstruction of the failed coup is based on interviews with Turkish and Western officials and Turkish citizens who took part in resisting the takeover. It wasn’t possible to reach the accused coup leaders, including more than two dozen top military officers, who were rounded up across the country.

The events on the ground caught the Obama administration off guard, and the Central Intelligence Agency didn’t see it coming. In the initial confusion, some U.S. officials thought the troop movements could be a response to a terrorist threat. Other officials thought it could be a sham, put on by Mr. Erdogan to strengthen his hand domestically. Intelligence officials told the White House that they believed the coup was legitimate, U.S. officials said.

On Sunday, Mr. Erdogan moved to extinguish the final flickers of armed opposition with an expanding crackdown on more than 6,000 military officers, soldiers, judges, police officers and prosecutors accused of taking part in the botched attempt to overthrow the democratically elected government.

Speaking at a massive public funeral in Istanbul for several people killed while fighting the coup attempt, the Turkish president vowed to clean the country of a “virus” that had infected Turkey.
New tactics

Mr. Erdogan, who has lost the sympathy of Western leaders who object to his broad domestic crackdown on his political foes, likely owes his survival to a counteroffensive that marshaled military might, technology and religion.

He beckoned the Turkish people to take to the streets and defend his government. In an ostentatious gambit, Mr. Erdogan sent a text message to every mobile phone in the country, a job so massive that some of the texts were still being received Sunday.

Loudspeakers at Turkey’s mosques crackled to life in the late-night hours with a call to prayer that was widely understood by many as a call to action.

The dramatic attempt to seize power faltered as Mr. Erdogan’s call to resistance fueled huge crowds already marching against the putsch and rushing to critical locations such as parliament to show solidarity with the government.

It was the first time in Turkey’s history that its citizens rose up to prevent a military coup. Since Turkey was founded in 1923, the military has toppled the government four times. This time, the coup crumbled quickly as key military commanders rallied behind Mr. Erdogan and popular support turned decisively against those staging the coup.

Mr. Erdogan blamed the coup on a political rival, U.S.-based Turkish cleric Fethullah Gulen, and the president seized the moment to crack down on his political opponents.

The crackdown is the start of what many diplomats, intelligence officials and analysts expect will be a broad and forceful effort to shut down Mr. Erdogan’s opponents and consolidate his already tight grip on power.

The president’s swift counterattack sparked speculation that he might have staged the coup to justify a power grab and keep the military in check.

“We might be watching a very grand theatrical performance, but I hope we’re not,” saidElif Eser, a 23-year-old finance student who opposed the coup but isn’t a supporter of Mr. Erdogan.

Turkish government officials said the coup was the work of a small faction in the military that was poised to be purged for suspected links to Mr. Gulen, now considered the country’s No. 1 enemy by Mr. Erdogan. Mr. Gulen gave a rare series of interviews to deny instigating the coup.

The botched coup began late Friday night when a small caravan of Turkish soldiers drove onto Istanbul’s Bosporus Bridge and shut down traffic heading from the Asian side of the city to its European side.

The bridge was lighted up with the blue, red and white colors of the French flag, a symbol of Turkish solidarity with France for the Bastille Day attack in Nice on Thursday that killed 84 people.

As the troops shut down traffic, people spread photos and video on social media and wondered what was going on.

Yildiray Ogur, a Turkish journalist sympathetic to Mr. Erdogan, said he believed the rumor that the troops were responding to a terrorist threat.

“No one said this was a coup d’état,” said Mr. Ogur, who lives with his wife and daughter on the Asian side of Istanbul, not far from the Bosporus Bridge.

Then it became clear that troops were closing down Istanbul’s two strategic bridges. Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirum appeared live on nationwide television with the first confirmation that a coup attempt was under way.

In Istanbul and Ankara, troops stormed Turkey’s state-run television offices and forced a Turkish anchor to read a statement announcing that military leaders, who called themselves the Peace at Home Council, were taking over the government. The military imposed a nationwide curfew, and armed troops moved into key locations across Turkey.

In Ankara, the fighting was more intense. A pair of Sikorsky helicopters commandeered by rebel forces repeatedly opened fire on the country’s intelligence-office gates.

At a military base near the Syrian border, rebel pilots climbed into six F-16s and flew off to carry out airstrikes targeting Mr. Erdogan’s sprawling presidential compound and Turkey’s parliament building.

As the coup unfolded with apparent ease, many people began to wonder about the fate of Mr. Erdogan. People familiar with the situation said the coup plotters decided to strike while he was staying at the Grand Yazici Club Turban on the outskirts of the Mediterranean resort town of Marmaris.

Mr. Erdogan’s security detail decided to move the president to another hotel nearby for his protection. Then he broke his silence to try to rally supporters.

He used the FaceTime app to appear in an extraordinary interview on CNNTurk, urging Turks to resist while the anchorwoman held her phone up to the camera. “Go to the streets and give them their answer,” Mr. Erdogan said. “I am coming to a square in Ankara.”

Mr. Erdogan’s appearance created the impression that he was in trouble and galvanized supporters across Turkey, who flooded the streets to take on the military. Soon after he spoke, loudspeakers at thousands of mosques came to life with an unusual call to prayer that was clearly understood to be a rallying cry for Mr. Erdogan’s supporters.

Mehmet Görmez, Turkey’s president of religious affairs, ordered thousands of imams to recite prayers known as “sela,” ordinarily reserved for funerals and special religious occasions. When issued at other times, the prayers act as a call to arms for the Islamic community.

“When I heard the sela, I prayed and took to the streets,” said a teenage girl who was standing guard outside the presidential palace Sunday.

Soon, protesters were wrestling rebel soldiers in Istanbul’s Taksim Square and laying down in front of tanks at the city airport. Outside the presidential palace, demonstrators picked up sticks and rocks to take on tanks trying to establish control.

One protester was shot in the stomach when he climbed on top of a tank, said Erol Cam,49, who joined thousands of others gathering against the coup.

As angry mobs squared off against the troops, some soldiers said they thought they were participating in a military drill, Mr. Cam said. Police guards at the palace tried to calm the people, with many believing that the soldiers had been tricked, he added.

Soldiers shot demonstrators outside Ankara’s police headquarters. Helicopters opened fire on Istanbul’s Bosporus Bridge, where troops shot at demonstrators who marched on their barricades, killing one of Mr. Erdogan’s top political allies and his 16-year-old son.

For many Turks, Mr. Erdogan’s appeal and the public response signaled the beginning of the end of the coup.

While coup leaders tried to project that they were in control, they weren’t. The military was split, and the coup leaders had led away Turkey’s top general at gunpoint. There appeared to be internal splits in key military units. Many appeared to lay down their weapons in the face of widespread public opposition. Perhaps most important, Mr. Erdogan wasn’t in custody.

When the elite commandos in their three Sikorsky helicopters landed in Marmaris, clashes broke out with members of the president’s security team and local police. A Turkish official said one police officer and a member of Mr. Erdogan’s presidential security detail were killed in the fighting.

Mr. Erdogan’s security detail had already spirited him to safety. Commandos who came for Mr. Erdogan pulled back to their helicopters, one of which malfunctioned, and then took off empty-handed.

While in the air, the aircraft carrying Mr. Erdogan and his small contingent was approached by what they believed were hostile Turkish fighter planes.

The arrival of the planes created panic on Mr. Erdogan’s plane because of concerns that the fighter pilots might be under orders to launch missiles to take down the plane or to try to force it to land so he could be arrested.

The fighters flew close by and seemed to be under orders to follow Mr. Erdogan’s plane.

Military commanders loyal to Mr. Erdogan dispatched their own fighter planes to rendezvous with his aircraft. Once those fighters arrived to escort the Turkish president’s plane, the hostile fighter planes pulled back.

Across the country, Turks found uncommon unity in opposing the coup. All of the country’s political parties, even bitter rivals of Mr. Erdogan, denounced the military takeover.

In Ankara, jets and helicopters carried out repeated attacks on the parliament building, causing significant damage. Visitors’ center windows were mostly shattered, and the buildings facade bore marks of bullet fire and shrapnel. The bombardment wrecked the main hall of parliament and destroyed the prime minister’s office.

Turkish officials said the rebel jet fighters relied on two refueling tankers based at Incirlik Air Base, where the U.S.-led coalition against Islamic State carries out daily airstrikes against forces in Syria and Iraq.

As dawn approached Saturday, Mr. Erdogan landed at Istanbul’s Atatürk International Airport, where throngs of supporters overwhelmed soldiers and greeted the president as he stepped off the plane. Even though fighting intensified, the coup seemed to be crumbling.

But the coup leaders weren’t ready to give up. Shortly before 6:30 a.m., rebel jets dropped at least two bombs that landed just outside the presidential palace in Ankara. The ground shook as plumes of smoke filled the sky. Scores of civilians were wounded, said Mr. Cam, who was standing about 250 yards from one strike.

One senior Turkish official said citizens from across the political spectrum could never have imagined the military would open fire on civilians or attack the biggest symbol of their democracy.

In none of Turkey’s previous coups “did the army attack civilian protesters or the symbol of our nation,” the official said. “That was the end.”

http://www.wsj.com/articles/coup-plotters-targeted-turkish-president-with-daring-helicopter-raid-1468786991

By THE EDITORIAL BOARD

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By Charles Faddis

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by:Mohamad Kawas

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