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Attacking Iran Would Unleash Chaos on the Middle East

By Robert Gaines & Scott Horton 15 June 2019

There is little doubt that Osama bin Laden would have loved to see the United States attack and overthrow another of Al Qaeda’s enemies, this time the Shia mullahs of Iran.

Undeterred by decades of carnage and the disastrous outcomes of prior conflicts, ideologues within the Trump administration are clamoring for military action against Iran. The exact basis for this escalation varies. Common among the allegations are concerns over Iran’s civilian nuclear program, in spite of Iranian compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the Iran nuclear deal) and their Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.

Other pro-intervention voices decry Iran’s alleged sponsorship of terror organizations or cite a general concern for U.S. interests in the region as a pretext for action. This view of the Iranian regime is overly narrow and ahistorical. Iran is a conservative state in a region otherwise awash in radicalism. Any military action undertaken by the United States or its allies against the regime in Tehran will represent a grave error.

Sponsorship of terror organizations or extremist groups is a hallmark of nearly all Middle Eastern states. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait have both lent financial and material support to Sunni extremist groups involved in the Syrian Civil war, Yet both remain in good standing as U.S. allies. Even Israel has aided rebels groups in Syria near its border, though Jerusalem denies that it is supporting extremists. Iran is not beyond reproach, for it has maintained relationships with Hezbollah and Hamas. However, these groups, while on the State Department’s terrorist list, do not threaten the United States.

The claim that the Iranian regime harbors or supports Al Qaeda is patently absurd and easily disproven.

Prior to the start of the Global War on Terror, Iran supported the foremost adversary of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, the confederation of warlords known as the Northern Alliance. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Iranian government handed over photocopies of three hundred passports associated with suspected Al Qaeda members to the United Nations. Of these three hundred, many would be forcibly deported back to Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. In an additional gesture of good will, the Iranian regime offered to provide search and rescue support, humanitarian relief and targeting assistance in the fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda to then-Deputy Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Ryan Crocker. America was initially receptive, accepting Iranian assistance in the Bonn Conference that oversaw the creation of the post-Taliban Afghan government. Special Envoy James Dobbins would later state that the Iranians were “comprehensively helpful” in the post 9/11 period.

Despite being rebuffed by George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech, the Iranians nevertheless doubled down on their commitment to positive bilateral relations with the United States. In a memorandum personally endorsed by Ayatollah Khamenei and delivered with the aid of Swiss Diplomat Tim Guldimann, the Iranian government offered to assist the United States in targeting Al Qaeda, submit to full transparency in its nuclear energy program, cease support for Palestinian groups, pressure Hezbollah into transitioning into a purely political organization, and recognize the two state concept for Israel-Palestine put forth in the Arab League Beirut Summit.

Through false attribution of an Al Qaeda attack in Riyadh to Tehran, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld were able to dissuade President Bush from additional talks with Iran. Then-Undersecretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton successfully lobbied for the removal of the Swiss intermediary Guldimann, further reducing the hope for future talks. In spite of these setbacks, Iran maintained its opposition to Al Qaeda.

From the cache of documents removed from the Abbottabad residence of al Qaeda’s slain leader, Osama bin Laden, it is known through translated correspondence that many members of the terror group who attempted to flee into Iran after the United States invaded Afghanistan were arrested by Iranian military and intelligence services. By April of 2003, Iranian forces had captured a number of higher profile Al Qaeda members like the architects of the 1998 Kenya and Tanzania embassy bombings, Saif Al-Adl and Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, along with a former top lieutenant of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, Khalid Mustafa Al-Aruri. Those detained in Iran also included two sons, a daughter, and a wife of Osama bin Laden. Though an exact inventory of the captured is inaccessible, it is known that with the exception of two escapees, Enan and the late Sa’d bin Laden, many al Qaeda members remained in custody at least until 2010, when a few were exchanged for a kidnapped Iranian diplomat in Pakistan. Had the United States agreed to continue cooperating with Iran for counter-terrorism purposes, it could have traded captured members of the anti-Iranian-regime Mujahideen-e Khalqh (MEK) from the battlefield in Iraq for an Al Qaeda lieutenant like Said Al-Adel or heir apparent Hamza bin Laden, rather than losing them back to the battlefield.

Figures such as former CIA director and current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and organizations like the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD), still insist that an operational relationship exists between Iran and Al Qaeda. This shouldn’t come as a surprise, as claims like these are a staple in pre-war propaganda campaigns. In reality, as the detailed analysis of the records from Osama bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound by West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) shows, relations between al Qaeda and Iran have been consistently antagonistic. The presence of Al Qaeda in Iran is only represented by prisoners of the regime. With Al Qaeda active in contiguous states, captive Al Qaeda members represent negotiating leverage and a deterrent against future attacks.

Attacks by Al Qaeda affiliates and splinter groups inside the country, such as a massive attack in February on members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, have further undercut accusations that Iran is acting as a haven for extremist groups. To counter these groups, Iran has deployed its forces to the battlefields of Syria and Iraq, makingconsiderable sacrifices in combating the Islamic State, and these contributions should be regarded as a critical factor in the defeat of the bin Ladenite factions and splinter groups in both nations.

An American military campaign against Iran would only succeed at great cost. The Iranian military is better organized and equipped than many countries in the region. Through the use of intermediate range missiles, Iranian forces could effectively engage large U.S. installations in Iraq, Kuwait, Afghanistan, Qatar, and Bahrain, as well as U.S. Arab allies in the Persian Gulf. U.S. naval vessels could be highly vulnerable to Iranian modern anti-ship missiles as well.

After the United States suppresses Iran’s integrated air defense systems and anti-aircraft fire, U.S. forces should be capable of destroying the regime in Tehran, at least in the short term. However, the prospect of occupying and stabilizing a country whose population and landmass far exceed that of Iraq should be a formidable deterrent. If, after initial costs of $2 trillion and decades of U.S. involvement, Iraq is still in disarray, how could any rational governing body logically pursue a similar strategy against a country over three times the size, with a complex topography and an equally diverseethnic and religious landscape? The Iranian regime, while imperfect, does maintain a general stasis between the varied sects of Shia and Sunni Muslims in the country. Under the chaos of war and foreign-military occupation, the outbreak of sectarian warfare like that of Iraq is a real possibility, made worse by the virulently anti-Shia Al Qaeda and ISIS waiting at the periphery. Prolonged and extensive carnage would surely follow.

Further complicating such a campaign would be the presence of the Marxist guerilla cult and U.S. foreign-policy establishment favorite, the Mujahideen-e Khalqh (MEK), who would also be vying for control of the state, despite that their popular support inside Iran is approximately nonexistent. The combination of these factors seriously diminishes the long-term probability of success for a U.S. invasion of Iran.

Some reporting last year suggested that the administration was considering launching a series of air attacks based on Bill Clinton’s “Operation Desert Fox” model. This would be based on the premise that the Iranians would be too smart to dare fight back and provoke even worse American wrath. Of course, this would seem to be a fairly optimistic take from those claiming that Iranian aggression against U.S. forces is forcing them to respond militarily in the first place.

That Iran’s so-called provocations are exaggerated and that they are likely to defend themselves with force if attacked would seem to be the more reasonable assessment.

As with all military incursions undertaken by the United States during the Global War on Terror, a major victor will be the Al Qaeda members who sought to draw U.S. forces deeper into the Middle East for the purpose of waging a war of financial attrition against the United States and destabilizing U.S. regional allies. There is little doubt that Osama bin Laden would have loved to see the United States attack and overthrow another of Al Qaeda’s enemies, this time the Shia mullahs of Iran, and sow a whole new generation of sectarian war, and warriors, throughout formerly stable, opposition-held Iran.

The Trump administration can recognize Iran for its potential in stabilizing the Middle East or can replicate past U.S. mistakes, solidifying this nation’s role as the foremost agent of global chaos.

Robert Gaines is an IT Professional and ten-year veteran of the U.S. Air Force and Air National Guard. He served with U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as an embedded liaison for ground combat operations.

Scott Horton is director of the Libertarian Institute, editorial director of Antiwar.com, host of Antiwar Radio on KPFK 90.7 FM in Los Angeles and the author of Fool’s Errand: Time to End the War in Afghanistan.

Behind the Headlines/June 17

With my warm greetings from our Stockholm studios, tonight we will look at the latest news of Iran and the Middle East, including the following top stories:

Attack or an explosion on the two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman, while the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been meeting with ayatollah Khamenei in Tehran;

Who and with what objectives has been behind this latest attack on oil tankers in the strategic waterway of the Gulf of Oman,which links to the Persian Gulf?

The fingers of accusations from Washington and some of the countries of the region are pointed at the Iranian regime;

We will also find out if the Abe’s trip to Tehran has achieved any of its objectives.

Our guests tonight are Dr Alireza Nourizadeh and Mr Ghassem Shole Sadee.

Read More »

Is Iran on the verge of another revolution


?And will it be a ‘Kaveh’ or an ‘Alexander the Great’ who leads it?
by Saeid Golkar

 This week, amid the fallout of tough US sanctions and growing political uncertainty, many Iranians are marking the 10th anniversary of the Green Movement. Ten years ago, mass protests erupted after suspicions arose that the general elections had been rigged in favour of the incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Reformist candidates Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mahdi Karroubi rejected the results and their supporters took to the streets to express their anger at what they saw as the trampling of democratic procedures in Iran.Today, 10 years later, many are wondering whether Iran is on the eve of another Green Movement or even a revolution. Indeed, some scholars have pointed out that there are many socioeconomic and political factors that could make mass unrest in the short term highly likely.

Others, however, have been arguing Iran is not on the verge of fundamental change at all. So which one is true? Will Iran see another wave of unrest and revolution or will the status quo prevail as the Islamic Republic resists foreign pressure?In its long history, Iran has witnessed many revolutionary movements and upheavals, perhaps more than many of its neighbours in the Middle East.

Today, four decades after the Iranian revolution of 1979, the country retains its revolutionary spirit, maintained by a vibrant civil society and a strong and rebellious intelligentsia.Iran also has a very young and educated population; nearly 10 million out of its 81 million inhabitants have university degrees and currently, some four million are studying at institutions of higher education. Historically, Iranian university campuses have always been politicised, while students have been at the forefront of protests, alongside clerics, workers, and the merchant class.

Iranian society is also quite tech-savvy and well-connected to the outside world; some 64 percent of Iranians are internet users, while mobile penetration has reached more than 110 percent (that is, some Iranians have more than one phone).

At the same time, large parts of the population have become increasingly frustrated with the Islamic Republic and its failure to deliver on the political, social and economic fronts. Many have completely lost hope that change can be ushered in through reforms, especially after President Hassan Rouhani, who has been seen as moderate, failed to live up to his electorate’s expectations and bring about political and social liberalisation along with economic prosperity.

The regime’s economic mismanagement and massive corruption, as well as continuing political and social suppression have convinced many Iranians that there is no way out except through fundamental social and political change – that is, “regime change”.

In the face of growing political, social, and economic crises, the Islamic Republic is struggling with maintaining its legitimacy.In this sense, the situation in Iran is ripe for another wave of unrest. Already last year, protests erupted across the country and even reached areas that had been until then relatively quiet.

It is quite likely that the country will witness massive upheaval that would affect various layers of Iranian society, including both the urban and rural population.But like forecasting an earthquake, it is difficult to say when this would happen and how long it would last.

What is clear, however, is that popular mobilisation is unlikely to result in a massive change or indeed the toppling of the current regime.As American sociologist James DeFronzo has theorised, there are five critical factors that guarantee the success of any revolutionary movement: public frustration, dissident elites, unifying motivation, political crises, and a receptive international community.

While some of these conditions exist in Iran today, others are absent.Although there is indeed massive public dissatisfaction with the status quo, this sentiment is hardly “unified”. The Islamic Republic has successfully atomised Iranian society and suppressed any online and offline channels or networks which could lead to mass mobilisation.

The opposition, which mostly lives in exile, is split along ideological lines and does not have a social base inside the country. While social media platforms help break the regime’s monopoly over information, they have also been used to spread misinformation and identify and suppress activists.At the same time, while there may be some disagreements within the regime, both reformists and hardliners are committed to the wellbeing of the Islamic Republic.

They also agree on the necessity to use the repressive apparatus to ensure the survival of the regime. Thanks to substantial investment in equipment and human capital, the Islamic Republic has developed multilayered and ideologically committed security forces, which are trained to and willing to suppress any form of civil disobedience.

At the same time, despite the growing pressure from the US-Saudi-Israeli axis, the international context is not necessarily conducive to a successful revolution in Iran. It is in the interest of both Russia and China that the Islamic Republic survives the ongoing crisis and they would not hesitate to back it, should it face any existential threats; the same is true for its regional allies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, and other Shia militia groups in the Middle East.Many Iranians are aware of this situation and live in despair, while actively trying to emigrate.

The number of people who would like to move out of the country is dramatically increasing. Even official statistics reflect this trend; according to a recent study, some 30 percent of Iranians would rather live in any other country but their own. Others have reached the point where they would welcome any US military intervention and see it as the only way to get rid of the clerical regime.

Talking to people back in Iran, I have heard this sentiment quite often; it reminds me of 2003 when many Iraqis welcomed the invading US army as a “liberating force”.Unable or unwilling to calculate the devastating consequences of a military conflict, one of my interlocutors repeated a poem from the Iranian poet Mehdi Akhavan-Sales written a few years after the CIA-sponsored 1953 coup triggered a wave of repression by the Pahlavi regime: “No Kaveh will be found, Omid! I wish an Alexander would be found.” Kaveh is a mythical Iranian hero who liberates the country from a foreign despot;

Alexander is the ruler of Macedon, who effectively put an end to the Persian Achaemenid dynasty 2,300 years ago.The man who recited the point, like its author, had succumbed to such despair that he saw no hope for a Kaveh appearing – for Iranians setting themselves free; instead, he wished for a foreign invader, an Alexander, to come and topple the Islamic Republic.But that hope, too, is in vain. Despite all the US posturing, a foreign force is unlikely to invade Iran.

While the country may witness another wave of unrest, it is unlikely to loosen the regime’s grip on power. Indeed, Iran will continue to sink deeper into a political and economic crisis, as the Islamic Republic fights for its survival.

Why Trump’s strategy against Iran is likely to fail

The ‘maximum pressure’ tactics will not succeed in subduing Iran, nor will an invasion.

by Hassan Ahmadian  5 Jun 2019

In 1941, in the midst of World War II, two imperial powers, the USSR and Britain, threatened Iran with invasion, although the country had officially announced neutrality in the conflict. While the Iranian leadership acknowledged the gravity of the situation, it refused to cave in to the Soviet-British ultimatum. For them, resistance and military defeat was more bearable than “treason and capitulation”.

Outnumbered and outgunned, the Iranian army was swiftly defeated and the Soviet and British imperial forces occupied the country for several years. Although severely weakened, Tehran continued to struggle for its sovereignty and a year after the end of the war, managed to regain it, as the occupiers were forced to withdraw.

This, along with many other episodes in Iran’s modern history, demonstrates that resistance is a fundamental aspect of Iranian political culture and has always been a driving force in its foreign policy. Today, as the country faces yet another threat to its sovereignty, it will abide by that same exact principle.

In fact, resistance is even more central to the political character of the Islamic Republic than the governments which preceded it. That, along with a number of other factors, guarantees the ultimate failure of the United States‘s attempt to have the Iranians capitulate.

Why ‘maximum pressure’ will not work

In April, the Trump administration announced it would not renew sanction waivers to countries buying Iranian oil and threatened with punitive measures those who violate the strict sanctions regime it had imposed. Since then, it has escalated its threats and hostile rhetoric pushing further with its “maximum pressure” campaign.

The premise of this strategy is that in the face of an existential threat, survival matters the most to the Islamic Republic. Pushing the Iranian economy to the brink would compel Iranians to rise up against their government and force the Islamic Republic to “act pragmatically” – so the argument goes.

Washington is hoping this strategy would exhaust Tehran and force it to come to the negotiating table on new US terms. But it may very well be disappointed.

While the Trump administration expects “maximum pressure” to leave Iran with no choice but to capitulate, the near-unanimous consensus in the country is that whatever happens, Iranians will resist.

The Islamic Republic’s leadership has made it a point to convince the Iranian public that any appeasement of the US would amount to a surrender. It has responded to the Trump administration’s threats with defiant rhetoric, which so far has worked.

While Iranians are suffering from the economic crisis, the US “maximum pressure” strategy is compelling them to rally around the flag, rather than try to “take down the regime”. This is not only because the cultural value of resistance is relatively high, but also because the more the Iranian leadership resists foreign pressure, the more legitimacy it gains.

And if the past four decades are anything to go by, the Islamic Republic would never trade resistance-based legitimacy for negotiations with a hostile power. That is why the least likely outcome of the “maximum pressure” strategy would be Tehran agreeing to come to the negotiating table on US President Donald Trump‘s unilateral terms.

At the same time, Iran will not remain passive in the face of mounting US pressure. It has the capability to affect Washington’s main regional priority – oil prices – without much cost and effort and it can do so without using or triggering a military confrontation. It can use its network of friends and allies in the region and beyond to disrupt the production and global trade of oil.

Additionally, Iran’s anti-trafficking cooperation with the European Union may also be affected. The Iranian authorities would stick to these agreements with the EU on paper but do nothing in practice. This could result in another migration wave towards the European borders or a significant increase in drug trafficking.

A war the US cannot end

If Washington moves to wage war, it is hard to imagine how it would bring Iran to its knees. There are at least three major challenges the US would face in such a scenario.

First, US global rivals China and Russia would likely back the Iranian resistance, albeit unofficially. Both have been irritated by the US pivot to Asia and the trade wars Trump has waged; a conflict with Iran would be an opportunity for these global powers to get back at the US.

Obviously, neither China nor Russia would fight for Iran, but keeping their partner afloat is of strategic value. Both have an interest in stopping Trump and exhausting him in a confrontation with Tehran so he would not wreak havoc closer to their borders.Besides military and financial support, the two could provide Iran with the political backing at the UN Security Council.

Second, if Trump starts a war, he would face far greater international isolation than what his abrasive policies have so far produced. Today, Iran holds the moral high ground because of its strategic patience and commitment to the nuclear deal, while the international community continues to reject Trump’s aggressive posturing. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was made aware of the limits of US soft power, especially after his recent visits to Europe, where he faced a cold reception and a rebuke over Washington’s policy on Iran.

Trump is perhaps counting on the US leadership position in the world – that when the US acts, the rest will follow. But quitting international agreements and treaties is one thing and waging a war is another. In all likelihood, if the US chooses to start a conflict, it would have to go about it without the support of its traditional allies. Its regional partners – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel – might also not be of much help and indeed could turn into a liability, disrupting US war plans by pursuing their own interests.

Third, a war with Iran would almost certainly be a greater disaster than the one in Iraq. The US currently is not aware of the full Iranian military potential. Having been long isolated from western arms markets, Iran has developed its own domestic weapons industry, the capabilities of which remain unknown to the outside world. This could certainly undermine US military planning in the run-up to war.

Although Iran’s military is inferior to that of the US, it is still much stronger than Saddam Hussein‘s army, which was decimated in 2003 in a matter of weeks. Iranian forces are much better prepared, more ideologically committed and more numerous. That, along with Iran’s mountainous landscape, guarantees the superiority of Iranian forces against any invading force.

At this point, a full US ground offensive is unlikely, given the debacles in Afghanistan and Iraq; an aerial campaign, however, will also not go without a response. Iran is capable of hitting US bases in its immediate neighbourhood and disrupting oil supply routes, while its allies and friends are able to escalate against US strategic interests and partners. The US risks getting itself into conflict it would not be able to end.

Thus, whatever path the US chooses – to continue its maximum pressure strategy or to escalate and start a conflict, it would ultimately face failure. Meanwhile, Tehran is edging closer to exhausting diplomacy. There are already signs that it is resorting to alternative strategies and the EU will be the first to feel the heat.

There are still quite a few parties willing to mediate between Tehran and Washington. The hope remains that they will succeed in de-escalating the situation and preclude a confrontation. It is still not too late for the US and Iran to settle their differences in a peaceful way.