Tonight we
will find out how the rising tension between Iran and US is affecting the
economic life of the Iranians.
Also, we
will look at the consequences of the open letter by the 14 civil rights
activists as more Iranians in exile offer their support for their demands.
Reports
suggests that a new political channel has been opened in Washington to
negotiate with Iran’s Foreign Minister but the White House has not confirmed
this.
Our gusts
tonight to discuss these issues are Mr Alireza Nourizadeh and Mr Abbas
Vahedian Shahroudi, one of the signatories of the open letter, as well as Mr
Ghassem Shole Sadee.
Tonight we
will look at the issue of Iran holding several dual nationals in its prisons on
charges of spying for foreign powers, as one of them, British-Iranian Nazanin
Zagheri-Ratcliffe has now been transferred to a psychiatric ward due to her
severe conditions.
Tonight we
will once again look at the rising tension between Iran and US as Iran’s
Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has been confined to a six-block radius during his
visit to New York for a United Nations meeting.
Former British ambassador to the U.S. Sir Kim Darroch referred to Donald Trump’s 2018 decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal as “diplomatic vandalism” last year, suggesting that the decision was made because the president disliked that the agreement was signed by his predecessor, President Barack Obama, The Daily Mail reported on Saturday, citing leaked diplomatic cables.
The memo was reportedly sent from Darroch to former British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson in May 2018, after Johnson had traveled to Washington in a last-ditch bid to convince the Trump White House to remain in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal.
Those efforts were unsuccessful and Darroch wrote to Johnson, saying Trump was “set upon an act of diplomatic vandalism.” He reportedly suggested that Trump’s disdain for Obama, “personality reasons,” was a primary motivator behind the withdrawal.
“It’s not news that the U.S. and UK differ in how to ensure Iran is never able to acquire a nuclear weapon; but this does underline that we do not shy away from talking about our differences and working together,” a spokesman for the UK Foreign Office told CNN when asked about the latest leaked cable. “That is true of the current tensions in the Gulf where we, the UK, are in close contact with our American and European allies to de-escalate the situation.”
Darroch resigned from his role as ambassador last week after The Daily Mail leaked other diplomatic correspondence written by the British envoy to his government. In those cables, the diplomat referred to Trump and his administration as “inept,” “incompetent” and “insecure.” He wrote that British leaders should not expect the Trump administration to become “substantially more normal; less dysfunctional; less unpredictable; less faction riven; less diplomatically clumsy and inept.”
Trump attacked Darroch, calling him a “very stupid guy” and vowed that his administration would no longer work with him. The president also criticized outgoing British Prime Minister Theresa May, despite the longstanding so-called “special relationship” between Washington and London. As a result, Darroch chose to resign, saying he did not see how he could continue to carry out his duties effectively.
BY MICHAEL MORELL AND ADM. JAMES A. “SANDY” WINNEFELD JR., USN (RET.) — 07/14/
President Trump has said that a U.S.-Iranian military conflict “wouldn’t last very long,” implying that the U.S. would emerge triumphant with minimal costs. While the president is correct that a fight most likely would end quickly and the U.S. would dominate it, the short- and long-term damage to U.S. interests would be devastating.
Neither Iran nor the United States seemingly wants a military conflict, but that does not mean one could not happen. Indeed, the likelihood of such a conflict is higher today than at any time since 2011, when Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu seemed intent on a massive strike on Iran’s nuclear program, which could have drawn the U.S. into war.
A conflict likely would begin with an Iranian provocation that trips U.S. tolerance, triggering an attack to deter Iran from further provocations. Iran would see this as disproportionate, and the response would quickly escalate. This would be a “fight tonight” war, without a weeks- or months-long buildup of U.S. forces; the U.S. would fight with what it has in the region.
Iran’s strategic goals would be to gain sanctions relief by demonstrating its ability to impact the global economy through control over the Strait of Hormuz; dividing the U.S. from the rest of the world; and gaining international stature by humiliating the U.S. — all while avoiding any internal threat to its regime. U.S. goals would be to bring Iran on its knees to the negotiating table; uphold freedom of navigation; prevent attacks on the U.S. itself; reduce Iran’s capacity to threaten its neighbors; prevent Iran from restarting its nuclear weapons program — and to do all of this with traditional allies and partners.
Though fictitious, here is what such a conflict might look like:
Iran announces that, based on illegal U.S. sanctions and recent provocations, the Strait of Hormuz is closed and it will attack any ships, military or commercial, attempting to transit it.
Dozens of Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy (IRGCN) small, fast boats immediately begin searching for ships that have not exited the strait. They conduct limited attacks, to avoid a major oil spill, on several commercial tankers, capturing one and taking its crew into custody. Iranian missile sites, many in caves or bunkers along the Strait of Hormuz, are activated. A single missile is fired at and hits a tanker; the crew abandons ship and is captured by Iranian boats. A number of Iranian vessels trying to lay mines in the strait are sunk by aircraft from the U.S. carrier on station outside the gulf, but others offload their mines.
Maritime insurance rates for the region skyrocket, turning away all commercial traffic.
Elsewhere, Iranian La Combattante and Houdong missile boats get underway from Bushehr in the northern gulf and Bandar Abbas in the south, searching for U.S. ships to attack. Although most U.S. combatants have moved to safety on the opposite side of the gulf, and several Iranian boats are detected and sunk by U.S. air power, a few missiles are fired and shot down by shipboard defenses. However, a large group of IRGCN boats finds a U.S. guided-missile destroyer and attacks it. Many of these boats are destroyed, but one launches a torpedo that severely damages the destroyer.
When Qatar refuses Iranian demands that it deny permission for U.S. aircraft to operate from Al Udeid Air Base, Iran launches a barrage of ballistic missiles at the base. Many are downed by U.S. anti-missile systems, but several get through and cause limited damage. Ballistic missiles are launched at Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain and other bases in the region with similar results.
The U.S. launches Tomahawk cruise missiles and other weapons at all known Iranian air defense and command-and-control facilities along the Gulf coast. Facilities that store nautical mines, as well as two Russia-supplied Iranian Kilo submarines moored in Bandar Abbas, are targeted. Missiles are launched against military airfields at Bandar Abbas and Bushehr inside the Arabian Gulf, and at Jask and Chah Bahar outside the gulf. The remaining Kilo submarine gets underway from Bandar Abbas, is quickly found by a U.S. submarine, and sunk.
Once Iranian regional air defenses are rendered inoperable, the U.S. begins systematically targeting known IRGC and military capability in the Arabian Gulf region using carrier- and land-based air power. Targets include missile sites, ships and boats, command-and-control facilities, military aircraft and logistics capability. Iranian military capabilities degrade rapidly.
In response, Iran launches medium-range missiles at energy infrastructure targets in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar. The conflict expands geographically when the U.S. attacks these missile bases.
Iranian proxies in Iraq and Afghanistan hit U.S. bases and diplomatic facilities with suicide attacks and rockets, resulting in U.S. casualties. Lebanese Hezbollah demurs on Iran’s demand that the group attack Israel, not wanting a war that would destroy much of its military capability. Instead, the group conducts deniable pre-planned terrorist attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets around the world. The FBI, working with the intelligence community, thwarts two such attacks in the U.S.
As the conflict escalates, Iran initiates cyber attacks against key U.S. financial targets, such as online banking services, ATM machines, and credit card servicing networks. Some of these attacks are successful but most are mitigated by cyber security investments the financial services sector made. Cyber attacks are conducted against sectors of the U.S. power grid; some are successful but quickly mitigated by physical overrides. Several gulf nations report cyber attacks on their oil infrastructure.
The conflict causes the price of oil to skyrocket to more than $250, and global financial markets decline sharply. With China in the lead, Russia and the European Union call for an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council and urge a ceasefire. Iran immediately agrees because of the devastation of its military and the sense that it has gained the moral high ground. The U.S. vetoes the measure but, because of the impact on financial markets and massive diplomatic pressure, quickly negotiates a ceasefire behind the scenes, with Oman acting as intermediary.
Indeed, the conflict does not last long — only four days. Although Iran is militarily defeated, neither side achieves all of its objectives. Because of extensive damage to regional oil infrastructure, and the effort required to sweep mines in the Strait of Hormuz, the price of oil stays well above $150 a barrel. Russia increases oil output and becomes the big economic winner. More broadly, the global economy, showing signs of weakness before the war, slips into a recession. Political divisiveness within the U.S. deepens as each side fiercely levels blame for the debacle. As the economic impact cascades, particularly in the U.S. heartland, the president loses the 2020 election.
U.S. standing in the world is deeply degraded. Even though Iran took the first shot, outrage is expressed at the U.S. by even its closest allies for creating the conditions for conflict and for its subsequent escalation and economic impact. The perception that the U.S. is too quick to use military power rises to levels not seen since the Iraq war. The U.S. loses a significant measure of global influence to China, which portrays itself as a source of world stability. Most of the G-20 nations begin to align around further reducing dependency on the dollar as the global economy’s reserve currency, with a goal of not allowing U.S. unilateral sanctions to define their foreign policies.
In Iran, the conflict knits the population together politically, deeply undermining any “moderate” factions. There is some debate about the way forward, but policy quickly coalesces around the views of the hardliners, who were angered by the original nuclear agreement, which is now in tatters. A decision is made to expeditiously build a nuclear weapon, leveraging several covert, dispersed enrichment sites of which the U.S. and its allies are unaware. Iran’s goal is to never allow such an attack on Iran again. In 2022, a nuclear test is detected that originates beneath the remote Dasht-e-Kavir desert in Iran.
Michael Morell, a career intelligence official, served as the deputy director of the CIA from 2010 to 2013. Adm. James A. “Sandy” Winnefeld, a career naval officer, was the ninth vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, serving from 2011 to 2015.
Moscow has a vested interest in the state of affairs in the Persian Gulf; it has tried its best to contain the impact that the U.S.-Iranian crisis could have on its own national security.
Will Iran crack under American pressure? Don’t count on it. Iran has grown accustomed to living under America’s recent economic sanctions and continues to pursue its own policies at home and abroad despite the restrictions associated with the latest U.S.-Iranian crisis. Tehran can rely on substantial domestic support and has a large army—including auxiliary paramilitary Basij forces—with access to air fleet, heavy forces and undersea arms. It also has revolutionary guards trained in unconventional warfare. Despite the impact of U.S. sanctions on the Iranian economy and the discontent among the citizenry, there has been no legitimate challenge to the country’s theocracy. In fact, the tension between the United States and Iran may drag on, which would require both regional and international players to permanently remain on alert. For example, due to Iran’s proximity to its borders, Russia has a vested interest in the state of affairs in Western Asia; it has tried its best to contain the impact that the U.S.-Iranian crisis could have on its own national security. As a result, the foreign policy Russia has applied toward the crisis can be divided into three main areas of focus.
The first area of focus is directly related to the size of Russia’s Muslim population and its ability to influence political processes in the country. These days there are about twenty million Muslims in Russia, a figure that has doubled within the span of three decades. Russia needs to prevent this population from being lumped into radical nationalist groups while at the same time representing their interests. Thus, Russia is concerned that the West—or even Iran—might have the power to provoke political and social unrest amid different groups of that Muslim population. In the past, Western countries have been suspected of supporting these and other radical groups on Russian territory. Moscow is also concerned about the possibility that a Shia and the Sunni confrontation could erupt on its soil and that one of those groups would receive support from Iran. It does not want to become a battlefield in the struggle between different religions. At the same time, Russia doesn’t want to ruin its relationship with the United States.
The second area of focus is concentrated on the areas that Russia sees as a part of its sphere of influence, such as post-Soviet countries like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, and other countries of the region where Moscow is very popular especially among some political and economic elites. These elites believe that Russia can help them combat the influence of radical political Islam. At the same time, these countries have traditionally strong ties to Iran. Due to this intersection of historical, diplomatic, and economic ties, the region is an area of mutual interest to both the Russians and Iranians. Cooperation between the two countries mostly centers around the Caucasus, Caspian and Central Asian regions. Russia has a long-term project, known as the greater Eurasia partnership, and Iran is a project participant. Russia tries to sell project participants on the idea that the project is a good alternative to further expansion of the West, which may cost them their national identities.
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The third area of focus is connected with overlapping humanitarian and economic concerns that impact both Russia and Iran. These concerns have been footholds in the history of mutual relationships since the time of Russian and Persian empires. Nowadays both of the countries are trying to compensate for their failures by pursuing policies that promote their own and unique civilizations. In this situation the humanitarian sphere is one of the strategic ones allowing to pursue long-term aims. Of note, Russian-Iranian educational and cultural projects have doubled since the Trump administration announced its strategy for Iran. While the United States has been focused on “bringing Iran to its knees,” Russia has been focused on the future. Economic ties between these two countries have been strengthening over the past few years, with bilateral trade reaching $2 billion in 2018.
Hopefully, Russia and Iran will maintain a positive relationship despite their differences and past difficulties. For example, in 2016 Russian forces were pushed off of a military base in Iran that it had used to conduct military operations in Syria. The strategic shift happened after the Iranians squabbled over whether foreign forces should be allowed to use an Iranian military base. Also, the two countries have had some disputes over the fate of Syria. Despite these issues, Russia maintains a positive relationship with Iran, which it further confirmed during a June 25 meeting between national security advisers John Bolton, Meir Ben-Shabbat and Nikolai Patrushev. During the meeting, Patrushev, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, declared that Russia would continue to accommodate Iran’s interests in the Middle East because it remains “the ally and partner” of choice in Syria. Both countries are focused on preventing further destabilization in the region, he said.
In conclusion, Russia wants to retain its position as a geopolitical player and influence the Muslim world, but it doesn’t want to get involved in the conflicts associated with that world. Thus, although Moscow’s leaders have valid concerns about the Middle East, they continue to see the benefits of maintaining strategic partnerships with various countries in the region. It is through these partnerships that they hope to gauge how much the Trump administration is willing to pay in order to achieve its goals.
Nadya Glebova is a fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, a MENA researcher.
Tonight we will talk to Mr Zartosht
Ahmadi Ragheb, one of the signatories of the open letter by 14 Iranian
dissidents in which they have called for ayatollah Khamenei to resign and an
overhaul of Iran’s Constitution so the country could peacefully go through a
democratisation of its institutes.
Mr Ragheb is a former employee of
the Tehran City Council as a fireman whose pension has been suspended for his
political views.
Having served the public all his
life he has also been jailed and we will find outfrom him what charges had been
brought against him and other signatories ofthis famous letter, including Mr
Zare, that has incensed the Iranian authorities.
Zartosht
Ahmadi Ragheb:
I began to work in the city
council of Shariar in 2001 as a labourer but a little later I received a letter
from the security organs of the government that told me I was an activist in
defence of the working classes and I did not have the right to stay in my job.
I have been subjected to
harassment and pressure by the security forces all these last 18 years
everywhere I have worked because of my views and finally lastyear the city
council fired me.
At the moment I am still waiting
to hear about my complaint made to Iran’s supreme court of justice against the
decision to suspend my salaries and pensions. My family’s social security has
also been cancelled and every time I have gone to the justice ministry to
complain they have arrested me instead.
Jamshid
Chalangi:
What made you join the rest of
the signatories of this open letter?
Zartosht
Ahmadi Ragheb:
This letter is a true reflection
of the desires and aspirations of the Iranian people, especially when you look
at the 40 years of the record of this regime’s policies which are nothing but
deception and despotism and squandering the wealth of our nation and taking the
country to the brink of social and economic collapse.
By openly publishing this letter
we have tried to reach the international community and ask their support for
the just and humane demands of our people for peace and prosperity.
Now our colleague Mr Nourizad has been jailed on charges of insulting the leader but we do not really recognise the legitimacy of these courts and charges and even the justice system itself that bring these phoney accusations against us.
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